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Abstract
Presently, China is the largest donor, trading partner, and investor on the African
continent. The current success of Sino-African relations can be traced back to global
South-South cooperation beginning in the 1960s and 1970s when China assisted in
funding independence movements across the African continent. Since then, China
established itself as a reliable friend and alternative aid provider. The country has since
transitioned from utilizing aid to foreign direct investment. Since 2013, China has
continued to bolster its own global economic positioning by pushing a foreign policy
agenda (One Belt One Road) that targets developing countries by providing massive
loans to fund urban infrastructure projects that promise development. China utilizes debttrap diplomacy to leverage Africa’s development of underdevelopment and resulting
infrastructure gap to gain political and economic power by fostering economic
dependency. Ultimately, China has used opaque foreign policy to evolve into a neocolonial force on the African continent.
In this senior honors thesis, I analyze the contemporary relationship between
China and Zambia. I argue that the Sino-Zambian relationship is historically rooted
beginning in Zambia’s decolonization process, largely unequal, and demonstrates China’s
silent but growing neo-colonial presence on the African continent. Applying an
interdisciplinary approach, I utilize historical analysis, media studies, urban studies,
international studies and political analysis. I engage with the theoretical framework of
neo-colonialism to decipher the complex power imbalance that characterizes SinoZambian relations. Highlighting Lusaka as my case study city, I analyze its social
fragmentation and growing anti-Chinese sentiment as a result of local perceptions of
Chinese hegemony. Anti-Chinese perceptions are exacerbated by local politicians and the
media, resulting in violence against Chinese nationals in Lusaka. Employing a research
method based in reading secondary sources, policy analysis and a content analysis of
media sources, I assert that while China is a neo-colonial force in Lusaka, simultaneously
Zambia’s preference in China as a primary lender is an exertion of Zambian national
sovereignty and decision-making capabilities despite deep debt distress.
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Introduction
Zambia’s sovereign debt is expected to reach an appalling and distressing ninetysix percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020.1 This news comes at
a time when the country is already scrambling to find ways to tackle the “impending
breakdown of its power supply, its inability to pay for electricity imports, and is staring
down the barrel of further defaults on construction project financing and bond
payments.”2 As of now, the government’s greatest focus is renegotiating, restructuring,
and refinancing its debts to its primary creditor, China. Zambia spent much of the 2000s
acquiring massive sums of Chinese debt for infrastructure development, as will be
explored in this thesis. It was not until late 2017 that the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) officially declared Zambia at high risk of debt distress.3 Since 2017, the Zambian
government has spent a disproportionate amount of its national budget on debt servicing.4
The Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR) reports that the
government spent ZK 9.1 billion on debt servicing in the first half of 2018 alone, which
was nearly as much as the entirety of debt servicing in 2017 (previously a recordbreaking ZK 9.8 billion.)5 As for 2019, “debt [servicing] payments have consumed the
largest allocation of the national budget amounting to ZK 23.6 billion or twenty-seven
percent of the entire budget. The amount allocated to debt servicing in 2019 is equivalent
to the total [national] allocation for health, education, and social protection [services]

Elliot Smith. “Zambia's Spiraling Debt Offers Glimpse into the Future of Chinese Loan Financing in
Africa.” CNBC, 14 Jan. 2020.
2 Smith.
3 “#DebtConcernsMe: Understanding the Impact of Zambia's Growing Debt on Different Stakeholders.”
CUTS International, Jan. 2019. 4.
4 Debt servicing refers to paying back the principal debt (the initial amount of money that is borrowed) and
interest.
5 “#DebtConcernsMe: Understanding the Impact of Zambia's Growing Debt on Different Stakeholders.” 8.
1
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combined.” 6 Debt servicing drains the majority of Zambia’s national revenues, at the
cost of greatly needed social spending. The distress of Zambia’s national debt crisis is
often discussed from a global economic perspective, concerning finding new sources of
foreign investment. Less attention is paid to the effects of national debt distress on
individuals. With that being said, “Zambians will be the first to pay the real price for the
country’s debt, as…social services are underinvested, and [the] economy is weak.”7 As of
now, new taxes are being implemented while old taxes are being raised, the Zambian
Kwacha is weakening, imports are becoming more expensive, and the entire country is
experiencing debt-fueled inflation. 89
African governments like Zambia experience a great deal of international public
scrutiny for how they have been able to secure an extraordinary amount of national debt.
But little attention is given to understanding why African national debt continues to grow,
or its geopolitical implications on the continent.10 Conceivably there is a lack of
understanding about the difference between national independence and economic
independence. By the start of China’s main wave on investment on the African continent
in the 2000s, nearly all African countries had declared national independence, but not
economic independence. Many were still and continue to be reliant on the economic
assistance of Western institutions and countries, and as will be addressed in this paper,
the East. This being the case, I contend that in African countries, establishing economic
independence is the same process as eliminating neocolonialism.11
“#DebtConcernsMe: Understanding the Impact of Zambia's Growing Debt on Different Stakeholders.” 10.
“#DebtConcernsMe: Understanding the Impact of Zambia's Growing Debt on Different Stakeholders.” 6.
8 “#DebtConcernsMe: Understanding the Impact of Zambia's Growing Debt on Different Stakeholders.” 11.
9 Kwacha is Zambia’s national currency.
10 Anzetse Were. “Debt-Trap? Chinese Loans and Africa's Development Options.” The South Africa Institute
of International Affairs, Sept. 2018. 1.
11 N. I. Vysotskaia and Arlo Schultz. “The Struggle of the African Peoples Against
Neocolonialism.” International Journal of Politics, vol. 6, no. 4, 1976. 12-13.
6
7
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More attention needs to be paid to the fact that China’s accumulation of SubSaharan African debt is not a fluke but an apparatus for the Chinese neo-colonization of
African sovereign nations. Since 2000, China has been able to accrue a little above
fourteen percent of Sun-Saharan Africa’s total debt.12 China’s aid and investment in the
continent is driven by its interest in improving its global trade and economic power,
while simultaneously fostering economic dependency, eroding African economic growth
potential, and undermining connectivity within the African Union (AU).13 Definitively,
the Sino-African relationship is characterized by an asymmetry of power.
In understanding the asymmetrical assertion of power between China and Zambia,
it is imperative to be familiar with the discourse that surrounds the subject. Foreign
policy is the consolidation of strategies implemented by a government to protect its
national interests in its interactions and dealings with other countries. Foreign policy is
often used to promote and protect national interests in foreign direct investment (FDI).
FDI is a business investment made into a country, by either a firm or another individual
country, after establishing foreign assets and business operations within the country
receiving investment. The term International Financial Institution (IFI), typically refers
to organizations founded through the collaboration of multiple countries, with the
intention of advocating for public and private FDI, to promote social and economic
development in developing countries. In the context of this argument, the IFI’s most
discussed are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These IFI’s
tend to implement Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) which are a series of policies

12

Were, 4.
Ernest Toochi Aniche, “Neo-Dependency? A Critical Analysis of Implications of Sino-African Economic
Relations for African Integration and Development.” Research Gate, Nov. 2015. 24.
13
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that debt-stricken countries must follow to receive loans and funding for servicing on
older debts. These policies typically emphasize privatization, neo-liberalization, currency
devaluation, and a reduction of government spending on social services.14 Debt
sustainability is an analysis of a nation-state’s current debt and borrowing practices to
determine that country’s long-term capacity to follow through with its debt servicing
obligations.15 A national debt crisis occurs when a country borrows large sums of money
at a faster rate than its economy is growing, thus the government is unable to service
(read pay back) its national debt owed to lenders, which can be another county or
international institutions. The phrase, debt-trap diplomacy was created as a phrase to
critique the Chinese government’s predatory foreign policy scheme of excessively
lending to already deeply indebted countries with the intention of repossessing national
assets and raw materials once the indebted country becomes unable to service its debts.
These debt-trap diplomacy loans typically fund urban infrastructure projects, which are
the essential physical structures and facilities necessary for a smoothly running society;
such as buildings, roads, bridges, power supplies, telecommunications, tunnels, railways,
electrical grids, airports, public space, and more. The Patriotic Front (PF) is the ruling
political in Zambia, which was formed by Michael Sata as “a grassroots movement of
revolutionary peasants, workers and intellectuals” with the goal of sustainable and widespread development for all, by condemning rapacious international investment. 16
Perhaps most important is understanding the term neo-colonialism, which is the
economic and political control over another country, particularly a formerly colonized

14 Welch, Carol. “Structural Adjustment Programs & Poverty Reduction Strategy.” Institute for Policy
Studies, 12 Oct. 2005.
15 “Modernizing the Framework for Fiscal Policy and Public Debt Sustainability Analysis.” International
Monetary Fund, 5 Aug. 2011. 6.
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(and still developing) country. At the core of neo-colonialism is economic dependency. A
neo-colonial power can be either the original colonizing country or an entirely new
country with more economic power, as is the case with China in Zambia. I deploy the
notion of neo-colonialism as developed by Kwame Nkrumah, and further explore its
ramifications in each chapter.
Today, China is considered a prosperous upper-middle-income developing
country.17 This has not always been the case. Beginning in the 1970s China underwent
intense economic reform through FDI and interior socioeconomic restoration. This
allowed for “China’s rapid economic growth exceed[ing] the pace of institutional
development” and ultimately lifting nearly 850 million people out of poverty.18 Whereas
presently China is a major provider of development loans, nearly fifty years ago when it
was an oil-exporting country, China “had its own experience as a borrower of these kinds
of credit…in the 1970s, when it received a number of oil-backed loans from Japan”.19 20
By the end of 1999, Japan had provided China with US $1.02 billion in development
loans, which were mainly used to build urban infrastructure in China’s coastal regions.21
China’s indebtedness to Japan did not foster economic dependence because while
accepting Japanese loans, in the late 1970s China simultaneously underwent “its own
program of socioeconomic transformation and reform, Gai Ge Kai Fang, meaning
‘change the system, open the door.’” This reform resulted in the privatization of

16 Chanda, Sunday Chilufya. “Zambia: Why the Patriotic Front Continues to Be Zambia's Number One Party
of Choice.” The Lusaka Times, 3 Aug. 2019.
17 “The World Bank in China.” The World Bank, 13 Dec. 2019.
18 “The World Bank in China.”
19 China began exporting crude oil to Japan in 1973. This ended in 1993 when China’s demand for crude oil
surpassed its own domestic production rate. Since then China has relied on imported oil.
20 Ana Alves. “China's Economic Statecraft in Africa: Continuity and Change.” Harvard Asia Quarterly,
2014. 8.
21 Masayuki Masuda. “Japan’s Changing ODA Policy Towards China.” China Perspectives, June 2003. 1.
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considerable portions of the Chinese economy and the liberalization of investment and
trade, not much different than the IMF implemented SAPs in Africa in the 1990s.22
Undoubtedly China mirrored its own FDI to Africa after its Japanese development
loans; nevertheless, the impact that development loans had on China is starkly different
from the current impact of development loans in Africa. This vastly different economic
impact is due to the fact that Chinese development loans in Africa are “taking place in
some of the poorest and most fragile countries in the world [with] the greatest need for
investment [and] the greatest economic and social vulnerability.” 23 China’s self-imposed
Gai Ge Kai Fang reform was exactly that, self-imposed. Contrarily, when Africa
underwent similar economic reform in the 1980s and 1990s (in conjunction with
development loans) to foster development, it was imposed by the exterior force of the
IMF, a West-dominated institution with a history of fostering the development of
underdevelopment in formerly colonized, thus economically vulnerable, countries.
China’s economic reform policies did not include the most detrimental conditions that the
IMF imposed on African economic reform, which are a reduction in government
spending on social services and currency devaluation, which both cultivated extreme
poverty before China’s massive wave of investment beginning in the 2000s.24 Evidently,
when China received Japanese development loans, the country was in a much better
economic circumstance than many Africa countries to begin with. Conclusively, China
utilized its own experience with FDI in the form of development loans to model its
foreign policy in Africa, yet with a dark, predatory, neo-colonial twist, therefore enabling
China to economically benefit in ways that the Japanese government had not intended.

22 Henning Melber. “China in Africa: A New Partner of Another Imperialist Power?” Africa Spectrum, vol.
43, no. 3, 2008. 399.

9

The existing literature on China-in-Africa and the Sino-Zambian relationship tend
to adhere to one of three prevailing schools of thought. One approach that scholars take is
to perceive and promote China as a violent neo-colonial force within Africa. This
approach is done by using antagonistic language associated with colonization and
uncovering China’s neo-colonial practices on the continent. This existing literature tends
to answer the question: How is China a neo-colonial force within Africa? A salient
feature of this school of thought is to focus on the fact that China is driven by its
economic agenda, which is bolstering its own global economic positioning. These
scholars argue that China has no genuine interest in collaborating with the African
continent as equal partners. Instead, China is responsible for pushing developing
countries that are already in the global economic periphery even further out, to gain
power and place itself at the center of the global economic order. Another salient feature
is that scholars target China’s extraction of natural resources as an eternally colonial
operation. These scholars utilize Africa’s history of colonization to argue that the
elicitation of raw materials from developing countries will always be colonial, no matter
the intentions. A scholar that follows this school of thought is Rudolf du Plessi.
Generally, there is extensive scholarship on China as an African ally and an agent
of development. A salient feature of this school of thought is that it promotes China as a
better alternative of FDI than the United States, Europe, and IFIs. These scholars fixate
on China’s offering of lower interest rates, the power of Global South cooperation, and
China’s foreign policy anti-political intervention approach. Another salient feature of this
school of thought is to emphasize how China’s economic engagement with Zambia (and

23
24

Aniche, 17.
William Easterly. Reinventing Foreign Aid. MIT Press, 2008. 351.

10

other African countries) has already elevated their political standing. Overall, the
approach of China as an agent of development in Africa tends to answer the question:
What can happen when China works with African countries? The focus is on the
perceived gains already experienced and the positive future to come of the Sino-African
relationship. The main theorists of this approach are Hong Yu and Ana Alves.
Lastly, there is extensive scholarship that conceptualizes Africa’s current
economic dependency on China as a result of the culmination of its economic history. For
instance, these scholars centralize their arguments around contextualizing Zambia’s
political, economic, and cultural history, to understand how Zambia’s economic
dependency on China came to be. A key feature of this approach is to analyze Zambia as
China’s perfect storm through its national history, going as far back as its independence,
taking into consideration rises and drops in commodity prices, the SAPs implemented by
the World Bank and IMF in the 1980s and 1990s, and Zambia’s infrastructure gap to
explain how China was able to penetrate Zambia’s economy through a small need-based
gap in which China’s blew open. Another key feature of this scholarly approach is to
compare the Sino-Zambian relationship to United States-Zambian and EuropeanZambian relations. These scholars assert that Zambia has neo-colonial ties with both the
East and West; the only difference seems to be the methods and approaches taken by the
neo-colonial powers. With that being said, the consequences persist and manifest in the
same manner. This school of thought tends to feel more grounded and less agendapushing. The main theorists of this approach are Deborah Brautigam, Chris Alden,
Anzetse Were, Padraig Carmody, and policy research institutions.

11

Recognizing the significance of contextualizing Zambia’s political and economic
history to understand the Sino-Zambian relationship, the arguments of this thesis follow
this third school of thought. Nonetheless, what sets my research apart from the literature
currently available on the Sino-Zambian subject is my interest in the human component
of urban infrastructure investments. In this thesis, I explore how the recent rise in
investment has been perceived by local Lusaka residents through a media analysis, which
I have not seen much of in other research. Overall, this thesis makes connections between
the academic and economic research on the subject and the on-the-ground reactions of
local actors and its political implications.
The driving questions for this research are broken down into two categories:
macro-level and micro-level. The main macro-level leading questions are: is Chinese
urban infrastructure investment in Lusaka a form of neo-colonization? What are China’s
motives in Zambia, and greater Africa? And what attracts African leaders to be
economically engaged with China through infrastructure loans? And how is China’s
interest in global trade and economic power influencing the urban transformation of
Zambia? An additional macro-level driving question that I didn’t anticipate would drive
my research was: How does the West impact the Sino-Zambian relationship? The leading
questions on the micro-level tend to focus on the urban component of the Sino-Zambian
relationship as it is experienced in Lusaka. These questions ask: How is China’s presence
in Lusaka perceived by Zambians? And how are loan-driven investments altering local
politics and civil society in Lusaka?
The methodology for addressing my research questions is an approach based
largely around the careful reading of secondary sources, alongside policy analysis and

12

content analysis of media sources. In order to answer the macro-level driving questions,
which focus on international affairs I inspect the political and economic engagement
between China and African countries, particularly Zambia. These questions about the
neo-colonial nature of the Sino-Zambian relationship (and the greater Sino-African
relationship) are investigated by delving deep into the origins of China in Africa and
contextualizing the evolving nature of the Sino-African relationship over time. In
addition, I use Kwame Nkrumah’s book Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism,
published in the early stages of African independence movements in 1965, to determine
my own frame of reference for neo-colonization. In regard to analyzing the neo-colonial
aspect of Chinese built urban infrastructure projects in Lusaka, I examine China’s foreign
policy strategies, such as the One Belt One Road initiative, which allows China to enter
African markets. By closely analyzing One Belt One Road I am able to uncover what
attracts African leaders, as well as understand the motives behind China’s massive
international investments, determining whether or not China is truly devoted to its claims
of mutually beneficial economic engagement.
Furthermore, I examine the infrastructure that has been built by looking at the
impact the projects have on the local community and analyzing the discourse that local
Lusaka residents and Zambian politicians use when discussing the Chinese funded
projects and the repayment of loans (or more so the inability to do so). As for these
micro-level questions which focus on local perceptions of the Sino-Zambian relationship,
I focus on collecting information from local news source websites; primarily The Lusaka
Times, Zambia Daily Mail, Zambian Watchdog, and Times of Zambia. By reading
through op-eds and letters to the editors I was able to uncover local attitudes, which in the

13

end reinforced my own hypothesis of China being a neo-colonial force in Zambia. As for
the judgment and influence of local politicians to determine how loan-driven investment
alters local politics, I looked at how the Patriotic Front’s former leader, Michael Sata,
catapulted to national attention by highlighting the matter of China’s neo-colonial
presence to national attention, making it a contentious political issue for the first time
ever starting in 2006. By examining local perceptions and completing the media and
political analysis, I am able to contextualize and expose the origins of the growing antiChinese sentiment and violence within Lusaka. Finally, in the interest of investigating
how Lusaka’s urban landscape changes because of Chinese infrastructure loans, I explore
the displacement of informal settlements in Lusaka’s urban peripheries as a result of
Chinese companies building gated communities for growing presence of Chinese
migrants, thus creating more urban and social fragmentation within the capital.
Comprehensively, Chinese neo-colonialism in Zambia is historically rooted.
During Zambia’s early postcolonial process in the 1960s and 1970s, China established
itself as an African ally through south-south cooperation and aid. In the wake of the
destructive SAPs implemented by IFIs in the 1980s and 1990s, the Sino-Zambian
relationship evolved as China utilized the neo-colonial process of Flexigemony to
leverage Zambia’s desire for development through urban infrastructure in order to fulfill
its own economic agenda. By the early 2000s, China established itself as an alternative
provider of foreign direct investment to Zambia. As a result, Zambia finds itself a victim
of China’s debt-trap diplomacy, which has fostered deep economic dependency. Being
that China is not the only neo-colonial force in Zambia and that economic independence
in the near future looks bleak, Zambia’s preference in China as a primary loan provider is

14

the exertion of Zambian national sovereignty and decision-making capabilities;
ultimately attempting to make the best of its no-win economic circumstance. Whereas
there is cohesive macro-level engagement, on the micro-level the Sino-Zambian
relationship produces urban fragmentation; particularly through a growing xenophobic
sentiment in Lusaka, which is heightened by the media and the Patriotic Front thus
resulting in violence against the Chinese expatriate community in Lusaka.
This thesis is broken down into three chapters, each tackling a different layer of
the process and nature of neo-colonialism in the Sino-Zambian relationship. Chapter one,
titled, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?: Contextualizing the Historical and Contemporary
Sino-African Relationship contextualizes the historic and contemporary Sino-African
relationship. This chapter addresses China’s motives for increased investment in Africa,
along with uncovering the African appeal. In addition, this chapter highlights the Chinese
government’s use of the neo-colonial method of what scholars refer to as Flexigemony to
penetrate African markets through strategies tailored to particular African geographies
and histories. Particular attention is paid to the One Belt One Road initiative, which is
China’s current aggressive foreign policy around the world. This initiative targets
developing countries, in which China gives massive development loans to pay for urban
infrastructure backed by either natural resources or the asset itself. Ultimately, this
chapter conceptualizes the Sino-African relationship as unequal because of China’s debttraps, the exertion of Chinese soft power, and Chinas undermining of African democracy,
in conjunction with the limited bargaining power of African governments.
Chapter two, titled, From “Win-Win” to No-Win: Sino-Zambian Relations,
Underdevelopment, and African Agency illuminates the Sino-Zambian relationship as

15

deeply rooted, yet very unequal. This chapter uncovers the origins of the Sino-Zambian
relationship in the funding of independence movements and projects in the 1960s and
1970s, following through to the disastrous effects of SAPs implemented by the IMF and
World Bank in the 1990s, and China’s growing FDI in the 2000s. It is exposed that
China’s current presence in Zambia has been made possible by Zambia’s complex
economic history. In addition, chapter two officially introduces Lusaka as the case study
city for investigating Chinese funded urban infrastructure projects. The history of
Lusaka’s urban development highlights Zambia’s infrastructure gap, of which China
recognizes and uses to leverage economic dependency. This chapter officially recognizes
China as a predatory neo-colonial force in Zambia.
Chapter three, titled, Investors of “Infesters”?: Social Fragmentation and the Rise
of Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Lusaka, diverges from the economic implications of China’s
neo-colonization of Zambia, and focuses on the on-the-ground implications for local
residents in Lusaka. This chapter addresses the local perception of China as a neocolonial force in Zambia, which has led to the growing anti-Chinese sentiment within
Lusaka. Lusaka’s growing anti-Chinese sentiment is conceptualized as local frustrations
with the Zambian and Chinese government that being taken out on Chinese nationals
living in Lusaka. Additionally, this chapter takes a look at the rhetoric in op-eds and
letters to the editor from local newspapers about the Sino-Zambian relationship.
Furthermore, a political analysis is conducted of Michael Sata’s 2006, 2008, and 2011
presidential campaigns, in which the Patriotic Front took a clear anti-foreign investment,
particularly anti-Chinese platform. In the end, it is conceptualized that politics and the

16

media heighten local frustrations with the Sino-Zambian relationship, resulting in violent
protests and riots targeting Chinese nationals within the Lusaka.

17

A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Contextualizing the Historic and
Contemporary Sino-African Relationship
As a result of political reconstruction that pushed for economic liberalization,
China has been able to rise dramatically in the global economic order.25 Whereas China
once found itself at the periphery, it now sits powerfully in the very center of the global
economic system. China’s continued economic success can be attributed to its ability to
leverage its own economic prosperity to push a foreign policy agenda that provides
massive loans for fund urban infrastructure projects that promise to bring development.
This agenda, called One Belt One Road, targets underdeveloped countries in which the
government is deeply concerned with development through infrastructure, yet is not able
to finance such. With that, Africa stands out to China as a strategic location because of its
large infrastructure gap as a result of its history which fostered extensive
underdevelopment, along with other factors. The current success of the Sino-African
relationship can be traced back to global south-solidarity beginning in the decolonization
process in Africa. China funded many decolonization movements across the continent by
providing aid (and weapons), often when others refused, basically making China a
longtime alternative funder to African governments. Over time the Chinese aid model has
transitioned from giving aid to what is currently used, foreign direct investment (FDI)
with opaque policies through the deceiving process of Flexigemony.
China’s current economic engagement on the African continent can be described
as utilizing the process of Flexigemony.26 Flexigemony is a neo-colonial method in
which the Chinese government contextualizes the particular histories, politics, and
geographies of the African nation-states it wishes to engage with, and adapts and alters its
25

Carmody Pádraig R. The New Scramble for Africa. 1st ed., Polity Press, 2011. 66.
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approaches to correspond with its spatial context.27 The core of this strategy is
maintaining flexibility in engagement strategy in order to cultivate the most economically
beneficial relationships between China and individual African countries. With that being
said, each country that China engages with, particularly through the One Belt One Road
initiative, manages a distinct relationship with the Chinese government. For instance,
China administers aid and investment in the form of loans to both democratic and nondemocratic governments, which significantly alters the ways in which it engages with
both types of political regimes. In countries in which African elites hold restrictive
control over the country’s natural resources, China requires external factors and agents to
develop personal relationships with the elites. Contrarily, in democratic African
countries, China’s approach to economic engagement places strategic importance on
adhering to the law.28 For instance, in historically politically unstable Sudan, the Chinese
government has focused on negotiating peace treaties. On the other hand, in more stable
Zambia, the Chinese government has focused on improving its public image within
Lusaka (and other major urban centers) due to increased civil unrest in response to
dissatisfaction with the rapidly growing Chinese presence.29
Flexigemony is a part of China’s neo-colonial intervention in Africa. The neocolonial method relies on China’s amicable historical relationships to justify its present
engagement on the continent. It is China’s friendly engagement with African countries
beginning in the 1960s, and stretching through the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, that laid the
groundwork for current Sino-African relations. Through the implementation of

26

Carmody, 75.
Pádraig Carmody and Ian Taylor. “Flexigemony and Force in China's Resource Diplomacy in Africa:
Sudan and Zambia Compared.” Geopolitics, vol. 15, no. 3, 25 Aug. 2010. 2.
28 Chris Alden. China in Africa. Zed Books, 2007. 90.
29 Carmody and Taylor, 2.
27

19

Flexigemony it becomes clear that Chinese neo-colonialism in Africa is historically
rooted.
By utilizing Flexigemony, the Chinese government has been able to slowly
emerge as one of the most significant forces in the African continent’s economy, nearly
unnoticeable. China’s slow and seemingly silent emergence in the African economy was
made possible by its ability to create personalized, substantive, and very private
relationships with different heads of state, in which information is virtually sealed from
outside actors. At the core of China’s Flexigemony strategy is its value of economic
power over anything else. China claims to have little interest in political and military
engagement and therefore opts to contextualize interactions to forge an economic
relationship avoiding political conflict. This corresponds with China’s philosophy of
heping juequi, translated as China’s “peaceful rise,” to global economic and therefore
political dominance by maintaining positive relationships with its global economic
partners.30
Unfortunately, Flexigemony is indeed a deceiving process. It promotes mutual
benefits for China and Africa through marketing tactics such as “win-win cooperation”
when in reality it is simply a way to push Chinese initiatives into Africa that allow for
China to exert soft power and ultimately undermine African democracy.31 With that
being said, despite the Sino-African relationship being historically rooted, the
relationship is very much unequal. African nation-states have limited bargaining chips,
and yet have more to lose because of their positioning in the global economic periphery.
And yet, despite the inequality in the Sino-African relationship, African governments
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continue to pursue deep economic engagement and integration with China because the
very little their get in return is better than the limited opportunities they have previously
endured.
The Historical Sino-African Relationship
For the past thirty years, many African countries have endured economic
stagnation despite being in the post-independence era, due to accruing substantial debt,
limited gains from exports, and the implementation of damaging structural adjustment
programs by international financial institutions. Simultaneously, China implemented a
political reconstruction, enabling substantial economic improvement.32 China’s economic
rise is characterized by its economy growing an average of ten percent per year for the
last thirty years as a result of economic liberalization.33 This systematic reconstruction
has permitted for China to rise from a developing country to the second-largest economy
in the world, trailing close behind the United States. Recognizing the African continent’s
struggles with the “paradox of plenty” - that is, being resource-rich, and yet economically
poor - China has historically perceived itself as being in a position to help boost the
African continent’s economy through aid.34 As foreign aid is an instrument of foreign
policy, China’s aid to African leaders is shaped by policies it established in the 1950s, at
the beginning of the Cold War. Beijing opted to pledge non-interference in the governing
of African nations and used aid to leverage support in competing against the Soviet
Union and the United States.35 From the 1960s to the 1980s, China’s foreign aid to Africa
became intermittent, and at the same time underwent a major evolution. Nonetheless,
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there is little known about China’s foreign aid practices. Despite becoming increasingly
transparent about its foreign aid policy, very little information has been released in terms
of the official figures, such as how much aid is given, and to which particular regions.
Out of the little that is known, it has been established that China has a long history of
giving vast amounts of foreign aid to mainly Zambia, South Africa, Ghana, Egypt,
Sudan, and Zimbabwe, among a few others.36 With that being said, it is known that
China’s foreign aid in Africa has historically supported a multitude of African industries,
such as the health, communications, agriculture, education, and infrastructure sectors.
In the 1960s, Sino-African foreign aid was quite intense; China helped fund
independence movements across the continent. This aid model remained strong
throughout the 1970s, in which China spent close to seven percent of its gross domestic
product on aid assistance in Africa during the Chinese cultural revolution, despite a brief
episode of economic difficulty.37 In the early 1970s, despite being relatively poor, China
loaned over US $400 million to Zambia to build the Tanzanian-Zambian Railway.38
Zambia gained independence from Britain in 1964. However, it remained vulnerable to
white minority regimes due to its endorsement of black liberation movements in nearby
areas.39 This caused economic destabilization because Zambia remained dependent on
trade routes that passed through neighboring regions occupied by colonial forces. In an
attempt to secure sovereignty, Zambian officials requested financial assistance from
international financial institutions to build new trade routes, but to no avail. When
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traditional donors turned Zambian officials down, China recognized this as a chance to
bolster Sino-African relations and volunteered to help construct and finance a 2,000
kilometer-long heavy railway line from the Zambia Copperbelt through Tanzania to the
seaport at Dar es Salaam.40 Packaged as a form of foreign aid, the Tazara railway was
financed by a zero-interest loan for RMB ¥980 million (roughly US $140 million).41 This
foreign aid infrastructure project was successfully able to stabilize both Zambia’s
national sovereignty and economy. To this day, it remains the most iconic example of
positive Sino-African relations and the success of China’s foreign aid on the African
continent. Unbeknownst to many, the construction of the Tazara railway kickstarted the
evolution of Chinese foreign aid to take the form of concessional loans for infrastructure
projects.
By the end of the 1980s, China’s foreign aid to Africa drastically slowed. This did
not harm Sino-African relations because of the copious amounts of aid that were
previously given. By then, China had gained the diplomatic recognition and respect of
forty-four African nations, except Swaziland, which has vowed to maintain its allegiance
with Taiwan.42 In 1984, nearly ten years after the construction of the Tazara railway,
Chinese leaders established an official transition of the Chinese foreign aid model,
directly linking aid to investment in the form of concessional loans.43 This new official
form of foreign aid was incredibly appealing to African leaders that were interested in
economically advancing their country’s through development. Chinese foreign aid
programs accentuated the importance of infrastructure as a necessary tool of
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development, “at a time when the traditional donors downplayed” it.44 Unlike other
foreign aid suppliers, Beijing identified a lack of infrastructure as a tremendous hindrance
in development, and therefore prioritized foreign aid in the infrastructure sector, while
also expanding and diversifying its aid model by combining pure aid with investment
projects.45 The prioritization of urban infrastructure lending continued and then
strengthened in 2000, when China implemented the “Going Global Strategy,” to
encourage even more outward FDI through the construction of infrastructure projects.46
This was a global venture that intended to take advantage of the booming globalized
economy by financing (and constructing) of infrastructure projects at reduced production
costs.
The Contemporary Sino-African Relationship
Due to its global embeddedness in development, China is often portrayed as
“ruthlessly developmental.”47 This reputation has gained more notoriety with the
implementation of the One Belt One Road initiative, which is essentially an expansion of
Beijing’s Going Global Strategy. The One Belt One Road is China’s most aggressive
foreign policy and economic initiative. The initiative was created by President Xi
Jinping’s new administration upon taking office in 2013. It is an expansive global trade
initiative that is designed to encourage outward Chinese investment through the
construction of infrastructure, investment, and trade between China and its neighbors in
designated regions.48 With the One Belt One Road initiative, the Jinping administration
43
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has created an alternative global development strategy in which China invest in global
infrastructure development (most commonly in less developed countries than itself)
through massive loans, and creates an abundance of economic interdependencies with
China as the central node of global connectivity.
One Belt One Road arose from an understanding that China’s nearby countries
have a strategic value in strengthening economic cooperation to catapult China into a
global economic powerhouse. Nonetheless, the initiative’s roots are in its historic Silk
Road and maritime routes that were discontinued in the 1600s. Essentially, Beijing has
reawakened its former trade, cultural exchange, and communication routes that once
connected Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In One Belt One Road, “One Belt”
refers to six central land routes of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” that connects interior
China to Central Asia and Europe, mainly through railways. The “One Road” refers to
the “Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road” which relies on three main ocean routes
that connect China with Southeast Asia, Europe, and Africa at strategic seaports.49 In a
very short amount of time, the One Belt One Road initiative has fostered global economic
dominance for China because of its central role and main trade beneficiary. The initiative
stretches to nearly seventy countries across three continents, incorporating nearly sixty
percent of the world’s population and accounting for approximately thirty percent of the
global GDP.50
The One Belt One Road initiative’s main objective is to limit trade barriers to
increase connectivity. In the age of globalization, connectivity is a direct line to economic
prosperity. In that regard, China recognizes poor infrastructure as a major obstacle to
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economic development because of its ability to impede living standards, local
industrialization, and foreign investment.51 To further integrate into the global economy
through trade and investment, China has placed improving inadequate infrastructure in
developing countries at the center of the One Belt One Road initiative. This infrastructure
development is focused on the energy and power, public utilities, and transportation
sectors.52 Around the globe, Beijing is implementing approximately 1,700 infrastructure
projects, worth a total of US $900 billion.53 By all means, One Belt One Road is the
largest development plan in contemporary history.54 On the other hand, the initiative has
very troubling implications for debt-sustainability in developing countries. Around twothirds of countries participating in One Belt One Road have national credit ratings below
investable grade.55 Chinese lending to countries with poor credit is largely controversial
as it seems that China is more interested in acquiring assets, rather than debt repayment.
The One Belt One Road initiative is an official framework for China’s increased
investment in Africa, particularly through infrastructure investments. Sino-African
connectivity is fostered through the Maritime Silk Road, linking China to nearly twenty
African countries. China’s reach extends through East Africa to Ethiopia, Tanzania, and
Kenya, up to North Africa reaching Egypt and Morocco, inland to Central Africa
including the Democratic Republic of Congo, and finally down into Southern Africa,
reaching Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa, to name a few countries.56 Overall,
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China’s presence in Africa has ballooned since the implementation of One Belt One
Road. Whereas previously Chinese investment came directly from the government, One
Belt One Road has allowed for the diversification of Chinese FDI to Africa. Currently,
investment (read infrastructure loans) comes from Chinese private and state-owned
companies, commercial and policy banks, and individuals.57 The transition to Chinese
banks has increased connectivity and strengthened the Sino-African relationship.
The One Belt One Road initiative extends through three continents, incorporating
nearly sixty-five countries. Africa holds a strategic value to China, which drives its
presence of the continent. According to geographer Padraig Carmody, there have been
several main objectives in China’s intensified economic connectivity with the African
continent. These ambitions range from the creation of an expanded market for Chinese
services and manufactured goods, to provide an alternative to the global Western aid
development model, to procure land for agriculture as it becomes scarcer in China, and to
provide new channels of migration to Chinese citizens.58 Nonetheless, the principle
motives behind China’s increased economic connectivity in Africa have historically been
to increase diplomatic support from African countries to gain global dominance through
allyship and to secure new sources of natural resources.
A crucial dimension of the Sino-African relationship is China’s use of African
diplomatic support for block voting. This can be seen when China attempted to
diplomatically isolate Taiwan. The fight for diplomatic recognition between China and
Taiwan has “been a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy since the declaration of the
People’s Republic of China…and has guided China’s Africa policy” since revolution first
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broke throughout the African continent.59 Beijing recognized its political strength as a
long-time supporter of anti-colonial movements across the continent and leveraged it in
return for getting African leaders to vote to remove Taiwan from its seat in the United
Nations Security Council.60 Whereas Taipei attempted to fight back against China by
conducting what is referred to as “dollar diplomacy,” by making small investments in
Africa to preserve diplomatic support, its investments were greatly overshadowed by
Beijing’s expansive investment power on the African continent.61 For the most part,
Taipei held on to international support until 1997, when China increased aid investments
across the continent, and support for Taipei slowly diminished. 62 Any remaining support
that Taiwan had from African countries slowly diminished as China began further
leveraging in economic power by pulling funding for infrastructure projects from
countries that continued to support Taiwan.63 The most prominent example is in the case
of Malawi. From 1966 to 2007 Malawi and Taiwan had strong diplomatic relations. This
came to a halt in 2008 when China offered Malawi billions in exchange for severing ties
with Taiwan and build an economic and diplomatic relationship with China.64 China
strategically offering money in exchange for severed political ties is an early example of
China exerting its soft power by leveraging Africa’s infrastructure gap and desire for
development opportunities as a tool of Beijing’s global political agenda.
Furthermore, it was African support that pushed for Beijing to host the 2008
summer Olympics and African support that successfully blocked resolutions at the United
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Nations Commission of Human Rights condemning Chinese human rights abuses.65
African block voting has been of such value to China that Chairman Mao Zedong, the
was frequently quoted saying, “’it is our African brothers who carried us into the United
Nations.’” 66 67 More contemporarily, Africa plays a critical role as an “ideological
battleground” for China to economically surpass the United States without military
confrontation.68 Peacefully surpassing the United States as having the world’s largest
economy is a major pillar for China’s One Belt One Road initiative. Comprehensively, by
building a strong relationship through the financing of urban infrastructure projects,
China essentially buys loyalty and global diplomatic support from African governments.
The other crucial dimension of the Sino-African relationship is Africa’s strategic
location as a resource-rich continent. Africa as resource-rich is particularly attractive for
Chinese officials that have an excess of infrastructure development capabilities and a
need for new sources of natural resources for its colossal population. Since 1948, China
has chosen to rely on a model of self-sufficiency. However, with its accelerated
population growth, the country is no longer able to sustain itself on its own supply of raw
materials.69 In response, China has resorted to collecting raw materials from the African
continent. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, China is pursuing not only
easy access to Africa’s raw materials, but also the ability to control their management and
distribution. The council claims that China may be ensuring its access to natural
resources as they become scarcer.70 A raw material that motivates China’s presence in
65
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Africa is oil. It has been reported that Algeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya,
Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria account for roughly ninety percent of China’s oil imports
from Africa.71 Additionally, South Africa supplies iron, and Zimbabwe also supplies iron,
along with steel. The Democratic Republic of Congo also supplies China with copper, but
Zambia remains China’s largest copper supplier. China’s seemingly insatiable desire for
natural resources is used for urban development and manufacturing.72
Following the Japanese model of resource-backed loans that was utilized in China
in the 1970s, China provides low-interest concessional loans to resource-rich African
countries, in which loans are backed by the natural resources available in that particular
African country.73 Chinese leaders have traded African raw materials for an abundance of
infrastructure projects financed by China. These projects range from sports stadiums,
presidential palaces, housing developments, roads, railways, parliament buildings, and
special economic trading zones. Trading natural resources for infrastructure is
deliberately used for countries that do not have the cash-power to pay back their
concessional loans. Between 2005 and 2012 Beijing’s investment in resource-rich
countries nearly doubled, while its investment in non-resource-rich countries grew by a
factor of seven.74 This implies that whereas securing natural resources is a strategic value
of Sino-African relations, it is not the core basis of the relationship. Rather infrastructure
investment capability drives Sino-African cooperation.
China has also taken a particular interest in Africa because of its growing middle
class, urbanization, the idle infrastructure development market, and desire for
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development as well as a more competitive position in the global economy. China’s
recent presence in Africa has completely reworked the continent’s position in the global
economy. Since the early 2000s, the Sino-African relationship has strengthened beyond
expectations. This relationship is characterized by China’s ability to help foster rapid
economic growth. Currently, China is Africa’s largest capital donor, trading partner, and
investor.75 As of the latest available figures in 2017, China invested over US $72 million
in the African continent, “more than twice the dollar amount of France or the U.S,” which
are Africa’s second and third largest donors.76 China being the African continent’s largest
donor has fostered the development of two distinct perceptions of China in Africa.
The first perception is China as a development partner and investor. Many
identify China’s current involvement in Africa as a strategic long-term commitment to
the continent driven by a mutually beneficial pledge to economic interconnectivity. From
2000 to 2010 China’s trade with Africa increased 700 percent; two-way trade ballooned
from US $10.6 billion in 2000 to a whopping US $166 billion in 2011.77 78 Foreign aid
figures follow a very similar path. In 2001, China’s foreign aid was US $1.8 billion to a
massive US $20 billion more recently. The main beneficiaries of this foreign aid are in
Africa.79 As for commercial investment, estimates say that there are at least
approximately ten thousand Chinese businesses operating within forty-nine African
countries.80 With that, China has transitioned from investment to economic integration
with the African continent. The second perception is China as a colonizer. This
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perception will be further explored in chapter two, where China’s infrastructure
investment in Africa is analyzed through the lens of economic dependency as a form of
neo-colonialism.
Africa finds itself in the difficult position of being the least urbanized, yet most
rapidly urbanizing region in the globe. Deborah Brautigam, an American political
scientist specializing in Chinese projects in Africa, describes the continent’s
infrastructure gap by saying, “if you could travel by satellite directly across the African
continent on a clear night, the vastness of African underdevelopment would hit you with
stunning effect.”81 82 This view corresponds with the World Bank’s assessment that over
the next ten years the African continent requires up to US $170 billion in investment per
year to achieve its infrastructure needs.83 As previously exposed, China has utilized
Africa’s infrastructure gap as way to economically engage with the continent. The
infrastructure projects China tends to focus on are building roads, railways, electricity
and major construction projects, aimed to improve the physical infrastructure of cities. In
exchange for funding Africa’s infrastructure projects, China requires the construction of
the projects to be completed by Chinese construction companies, many of which are
state-owned, or local construction firms that are joint ventures with Chinese construction
companies.84 This stipulation creates big business for Chinese companies through
employment and the gaining of a foothold in the local markets. However, there are many
reports of complaints that Chinese-sponsored infrastructure projects are of low-quality.
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Historically, China’s financing of urban infrastructure projects in Africa has come
from a variety of financial institutions and funds established by the Chinese government.
Despite the People’s Republic of China being founded in 1948, it was only in 1984 that
the Chinese government established the People’s Bank of China as the country’s central
bank. In this new role, the bank was mainly held responsible for implementing monetary
policy, regulating all of mainland China’s financial institutions, and foreign exchange.85
Strategically, the first People’s Bank of China in Africa was founded in Zambia in 1997,
at the very start of efforts to more deeply economically integrate the two nation-states.86
In 1994, closely following the establishment of The People’s Bank of China, The China
Export-Import Bank, more popularly known as The Chinese Exim Bank, was founded,
along with the China Development Bank.87 These banks continue to play a fundamental
part in Beijing’s outreach to the African government. The Chinese Exim Bank and the
China Development Bank are government owned institutions that promote government
interest by maintaining the expansion of Chinese businesses in Africa by providing nonconcessional international loans and credit for construction and investment
opportunities.88
The Chinese Exim Bank is most known for its flexible lending and risk averse
policies, discounted rates, long-repayment periods and interest payment “holidays,”
which particularly appeal to African leaders.89 On the other hand, the China Development
Bank has become a more popular choice for Chinese companies to finance urban
infrastructure projects in Africa because of its visible prominence on the continent.
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Before establishing its government-backed private equity fund, the China-Africa
Development Fund in 2007, the China Development Bank had already set up temporary
offices in African capitals to build governmental relationships on the continent. At that
time, they explored investment project opportunities mainly in urban infrastructure, but
also in agriculture, manufacturing, telecommunications, and resource extraction
industries.90
The China-Africa Development Fund was founded on US $3 billion, with the
intention to invest between US $5 and $50 million for each urban infrastructure project.
The objective of the fund was to partner with European nation-states that maintain close
ties with their former colonies to finance urban development projects. A spokesperson of
the fund declared that European countries “may have developed a plan to invest in
infrastructure [in former colonies in Africa], but they haven’t raised the money. We can
use these plans. We would like to join their efforts. We would like to have joint
projects.’” 91 Unfortunately, these plans never materialized due to economic competition
between China and Europe. Instead, the China-Africa Development Fund opted to get
into the business of helping Chinese companies invest in long-term ventures with high
returns in Africa’s urban centers.92
Comprehensively, the People’s Bank of China, the Chinese Exim Bank, and the
China-Africa Development Fund (through the funding of The China Development Bank),
favor lending for infrastructure projects that are backed by Africa’s natural resources.93
Between 2009 and 2012, Chinese financial institutions financed nearly US $10 billion to
African governments in the form of concessional loans. In March of 2013, while on his

90
91

Bräutigam, 94.
Bräutigam, 94.

34

first tour of Africa, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that the Chinese government
would double China’s commitment to urban infrastructure development in Africa,
ultimately promising that its financial institutions would loan African governments US
$20 billion between 2013 and 2015.94 Shortly after, following through with President Xi
Jinping’s commitment to economic engagement in Africa, more loans were promised to
African governments. In November of 2013, the head sovereign risk analyst of the
Chinese Exim Bank assured that by 2025, China will provide African governments with
US $1 trillion in urban infrastructure financing through direct investment, soft loans,
concessional loans, and commercial loans.95 These promised loans would be funded as a
part of China’s new One Belt One Road Initiative, ultimately guaranteeing further
economic integration between China and the African continent. The multi-billion-dollar
low-interest loans funded through the One Belt One Road initiative are also backed by
the resources available in the particular African countries they are given to, most
popularly oil or minerals. Most frequently, these loans are usually given to African
nation-states with awfully low credit ratings, which impedes their ability to access loan
funding from the international financial market.96 China’s ability to give poor credit
countries access to low-interest loans continues to appeal to African leaders, incentivizing
them to completely overlook and ignore China’s lack of transparency and hidden
conditions in loan funding.
Despite asserting that its foreign policy approach is based in noninterference, over
time, Beijing has developed the ability to push its own political agendas on the African
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countries it supports through foreign aid investment, particularly infrastructure
investment. This strategy is the exertion of Beijing’s soft power, in which it can influence
the decision-making and behavior of its African partners, without military force.97
Beijing’s soft (and sometimes hard) power approach is characterized by pulling funding
for infrastructure projects and emphasizing to African leaders the massive investments
that Beijing has made in their urban centers in the past and present. By utilizing
infrastructure (read development), as a pressure point, Beijing is able to instill fear in
African leaders to cooperate with Beijing’s global agendas. This soft power strategy has
been implemented since 1978.98 By employing infrastructure projects as statecraft
Beijing is able to continue to assert that the political and economic rise of China will “not
come at the cost of any other country, will not stand in the way of any other country, nor
pose a threat to any other country,” because of its use of desperation as a bargaining
chip.99 Nonetheless, this desperation is packaged as the power of choice. In its barest
essence, the African leaders are making the choice. However, this does not take into
consideration the nuance of choice. Despite maintaining its peaceful nature, when taking
into account that African leaders are being forced to choose development through
infrastructure over making sovereign decisions, the uneven nature of Sino-African
partnerships is exposed. By exerting its soft power, it is clear that Beijing is much more
powerful than its African counterparts and is by no means afraid to use its power. It has
become clear that Beijing’s “own impressive development trajectory has provided it with
the credibility to challenge the development paths, rules, and norms advocated by the
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multilateral institutions shaping the global order.”100 For instance, the Chinese Exim
Bank is currently Africa’s largest supplier of infrastructure loans, an advantage that
China is able to hold over African leaders. However, African leaders have limited
pressure points of equal value to hold over China. The scant bargaining power that
African leaders do have, such as control over raw materials, is delegitimized by China’s
ability to get resources from elsewhere. For instance, despite being China’s largest
supplier of copper, the Zambian government has limited bargaining power over its
copper. If the Zambian government ever tried to use its copper exports to China as
leverage, the Chinese government could easily pull investment and replace Zambian
copper exports with copper from its second-largest supplier, Chile (followed by Peru).101
102

It becomes clear that by non-interference Beijing was referring specifically to Western

techniques of establishing power, like the military and conflict. On the other hand, China
leverages development to exert soft power which undermines African democracy by
forcing certain outcomes that African leaders have either previously rejected or expressed
little interest. Despite the difference in approach, China and the West equally undermine
African democracy. The idea that China is better for Africa than the West stems from
Beijing’s marketing playing on African apprehension of Western intervention due to their
colonial history. By positioning itself as a more reliable and less aggressive economic
partner Beijing is able to remain, for lack of a better term, a wolf in sheep’s clothing
within Africa.
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China’s core philosophy of avoiding political conflict by focusing exclusively on
mutually beneficial economic engagement is packaged as “win-win cooperation.”103
China’s policy of non-interference is guided by four main principles, also described as
the “’four no’s’: no hegemony, no power politics, no military alliances, and no arms
racing.”104 By focusing only on economic cooperation, China’s approach could not be
more different than the dominant Western aid programs implemented in Africa, which
strongly rely on interventionism to create power politics for Western countries, and in
fact, do very little for the development of African countries. Shortly after the
announcement of the expansion of China’s economic connectivity through the One Belt
One Road initiative, it was reported that at the heart of the initiative was the desire to
come together to achieve “’The Chinese Dream’ and ‘The African Dream,’ through
“sincerity, equality and mutual benefit; solidarity and common development.”105106
Internationally China’s non-interference approach has been criticized as a blatant
disregard for human rights for their refusal to intervene in the affairs of African states.
However, many times before, representatives of the One Belt One Road initiative have
spoken out to clarify that nonintervention policy is based on their rejection of externally
imposed solutions.107 By basing the initiative in non-interference the Chinese government
was able to successfully entice African leaders by validating the autonomy of African
states to govern as they chose while also increasing development. And yet, despite claims
of being mutually beneficial, China’s relationship with African countries is still perceived
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as uneven by many international forces because of the creation of an enormous foothold
on the African continent.
Despite having surmounted its own development challenges to achieve economic
prosperity, Chinese officials conceptualize the country as still developing, and therefore a
leader of the Global South.108 Beijing’s foreign policy, particularly the One Belt One
Road initiative, is China “leveraging uneven development, using Africa and other global
peripheries, as raw material springboards…This ascent is cloaked in the rhetoric
of….’South-South’ cooperation.”109 South-South cooperation, also known as ‘Bandung
Spirit,” first emerged as powerful rhetoric in 2000, at the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation.110 Since then, China has utilized its position as a member of the global
south, having also been previously exploited by colonial powers, and as historically
supporting anti-colonial movements in Africa to strategically align itself with African
leaders that fiercely want to replace colonial-era infrastructure that is not only outdated
but also a constant reminder of a dark history.
There are many motivations for African leaders to economically engage more
deeply with China. Since its outset, the South solidarity sentiment, which can also be
described as China as an alternative funder, has been a major motivation factor for
African leaders to increase economic connectivity through infrastructure development.
African leaders tend to have a deep distaste for the Western aid model that seemingly
cannot depart from its colonial tendencies in implementing foreign policy, particularly
foreign aid. In having a common experience as other less developed nations, China
asserts that the Western powers are “out of touch with the needs of contemporary
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Africa.”111 Many African leaders believe that the Chinese model of development is better
suited for their own countries because of their shared historical experiences. This belief is
strengthened by the fact that China refuses to propose its own model of development, and
instead prefers to support African leaders in determining their own development paths,
with the help of Chinese funding through loans. Despite China not choosing a
development model for its African counterparts, many African leaders would like to
replicate China’s development model due to its rapid success (as defined by development
and a large and continuously growing economy). These governments recognize that the
gap between the developed and the underdeveloped only grows, and therefore would like
to follow in China’s footsteps of building wealth through infrastructure development.
Furthermore, a motivation for African governments is that economic integration with
China provides them with political recognition and legitimacy. African players recognize
China’s use of Africa as a strategic location and recognize the strength African block
voting has in global diplomacy. Overall, the main reason for African cooperation in the
Sino-African relationship is because of the ability to utilize aid, investment, and trade to
further develop beyond the possibility of what their own funding can provide.
China has utilized its own economic success to further upgrade its global
economic positioning by pushing foreign policy agendas that promise development.
China pursues colossal debt from underdeveloped African countries in return for toying
with their desperation for development through infrastructure, to accommodate Africa’s
exploding urban population. This pursuit, on China’s account, is deeply problematic
because the Sino-African relationship is marketed as a partnership when in reality it is
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anything but that. Despite being historically rooted in the empowerment of African
nations, contemporarily the Sino-African relationship is top-down and blatantly unequal.
African governments are giving up their raw materials and decision-making capabilities
in return for infrastructure that they are unable to pay back sustainably and that will most
likely be repossessed by China. In the end, Africa gains very little and China exceedingly
benefits through the accumulation of raw materials, state-assets, block voting benefits,
more economic legitimacy, and more geopolitical control over the region. Ultimately,
claims of Sino-African relations being “win-win” is outright misinformation. The
unequal nature of Sino-African relations can be most easily observed in the SinoZambian relationship. To look more deeply at the integrity of the Sino-Zambian
relationship, this thesis will utilize China’s presence in Lusaka as a case study.
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“Win-Win” to No-Win: Sino-Zambian Relations, Underdevelopment,
and African Agency
Zambia is considered a Southern African country due to its extensive social and
economic connectivity with other countries in the Southern African region. As one of the
most urbanized countries in Africa, it has an urbanization rate of over fifty percent.112
Zambia’s major urban center, Lusaka, was first developed when the territory was taken
from the original indigenous people, the majority of which were the Soli and Lenje
people, and colonized by the British South African Company in the 1890s.113 114 Under
British colonial rule Zambia was called Northern Rhodesia; initially, the territory did not
have any major urban centers, but this is not to say that Zambia’s urban history begins
with its European colonization.115 Lusaka was officially declared a city in 1913, but
records show that settlers had already established their presence in towns further north in
Zambia’s Copperbelt at least a decade before.116117 Many of Zambia’s other major cities
developed in the 1930s as a result of the growing copper mining industry that began in
the 1920s.118 119
Lusaka was named by the British after the previous Chief Lusaka of the Soli
people. In 1905, Lusaka was established as a five kilometer long and 1.5-kilometer wide
railway siding for a railway line that was primarily used to ship copper from the Katanga
Province (in present-day the Democratic Republic of Congo) to ports in South Africa.120
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However, noticing Lusaka’s potential as a new and strategic point in Southern Africa, the
city grew because it appealed to white farmer settlers mostly from South Africa. As the
city grew, the British South African Company attained a charter from the British
government to grant white settlers in Lusaka that right to maintain and govern their local
affairs.121 Lusaka continued to grow and expand and in 1931 it was established as the
capital of Northern Rhodesia because of its strategic location on the main north-to-south
African railway line, which was expected to become a critical urban development hub.
Additionally, Lusaka was the most domestically interconnected urban center in Zambia,
was within close reach of the Copperbelt, and contained significant underground water
resources located within limestone/dolomite aquifers. Initial plans for Lusaka conceived
it as Northern Rhodesia’s administration center, which resulted in the city as a mostly
white space with limited possibility of alternative economic activity besides government
administration.122 It was not until after 1948 that Lusaka’s black population swelled due
to an ordinance that granted black African families the right to live in the city. Previously
black African men were permitted only temporary urban residence permits dependent
upon their employment contracts; their wives and children were not allowed to the right
to reside in Lusaka with them.123 Despite Zambia gaining its independence in 1964,
Lusaka maintained its position as the country’s economic and governmental hub as it
transitioned into a majority black space.
Contemporarily Lusaka remains Zambia’s most crucial economic, governmental,
and commercial hub. Despite being a rather small city in comparison to the populations
of other African capitals, Lusaka is one of the fastest developing cities in Southern
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Africa. Today, Zambia finds itself in a rather difficult economic position due to the
decline and stagnation of its copper mining industry in the 1970s and 1980s which has
resulted in dramatically decreased economic production and growing national debt.124
Since then, Lusaka has battled increasing rates of urban poverty despite being one of the
least impoverished urban centers in Zambia. The bulk of Lusaka’s urban poor resides in
large informal peri-urban settlements with limited public services.125 These populations
tend to go unaccounted for, which is reflected in Lusaka’s reported population; whereas it
is officially reported that the city has a population of roughly 1.7 million, many sources
estimate the population is closer to over two million, with the uncounted population
living in the unauthorized peri-urban slums.126 Lusaka’s current lack of housing
affordability and a social safety net is a reflection of the city’s colonial roots and the
inability of the post-independence government to provide the city with adequate
infrastructure for the rapidly growing urban population. The national and local
governments have long battled with overcrowding and a lack of satisfactory
infrastructure and public services, which ultimately cripples economic productivity and
makes vulnerable city-dwellers susceptible to both extreme poverty and disease.
Since the start of Zambia’s economic decline in the 1980s, the government has
attempted economic development through support from international financial
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, as well as
aggressively trying to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) through the privatization of
state assets such as the copper mines. Recognizing its lack of infrastructure, the Zambian
government has strategically placed its efforts in building infrastructure in the country’s
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urban centers. Due to corresponding interests, overtime Zambia has forged a strong
relationship with China in which the infrastructure loans previously discussed in chapter
one are implemented in Zambian cities, particularly Lusaka, because of its high level of
connectivity due to road integration.127 China currently holds the most loan contracts in
Zambia’s infrastructure building sector; China finances a massive eighty-three percent of
the industry.128 Whereas China sometimes receives praise for supposedly alleviating
Zambia’s economic and technological gaps, it is important to remain critical of any
exterior forces and influences within the African continent, especially from advanced and
economically developed nation-states such as China. China’s enlarging influence in
Zambia (as well as the rest of Africa) through resource- and asset-based loans for
infrastructure has raised concern as to whether or not China is a neo-colonial force within
Zambia. The question becomes, is China utilizing its foreign aid assistance programs
(which incorporates FDI) to produce economic dependency through “debt-trap
diplomacy” to assert institutional change and alter economic development in Zambia?
Kwame Nkrumah was the first President of Ghana from 1957, when he led the
nation to independence from British colonial rule until 1966 when he was ousted from
political power after Ghana’s military organized a coup against him.129 It’s fitting that as
the first president of sub-Saharan Africa’s first sovereign nation, Nkrumah was also one
of the earliest African scholars to address neo-colonialism. In his seminal book, NeoColonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, published in 1965, he conceptualized that
the “essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory,
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independent and has all of the outward trappings of international sovereignty [when] in
reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.”130
Nkrumah emphasizes that investment acts as a “revolving credit” that is paid by the neocolonial force to the neo-colonized country, and then returned to the neo-colonial force
with increased profits.131 According to Nkrumah, governing African elites serve as
facilitators of the process by receiving investment as direct payments for running the neocolonized state, resulting in exploitation, increased gaps between developed (read rich)
and developing (read poor) countries, and the domestic inability of neo-colonized
countries to support industrialization thus making development nearly impossible.
Nkrumah addresses the deceptiveness of neo-colonialism by explaining that its
attractiveness is the possibility of improving local quality of life, but its objective is to
reduce local living standards for the sake of the economic gain of the neo-colonial
country.132 He supposes that “it is only when this contradiction is understood that the
failure of innumerable ‘aid’ programs, many of them well-intentioned, can be
explained.”133 In general, Nkrumah considered neo-colonialism as “the worst form of
imperialism [explaining that] for those who practice it, it means power without
responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress.”134
Referencing China’s supposed non-interventionist policy approach to financing urban
infrastructure projects in Lusaka, China maintains the economic dependency of Zambia.
Zambian economic dependence is contingent on its increasing desire and need for
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infrastructure to build-up debt without China having to claim responsibility for Zambia’s
dwindling economy, ultimately taking advantage of the fact that Zambia was never able
to build a prosperous independent economy post-independence. Whereas neo-colonialism
is sometimes described as an imperial force penetrating its former colonies through
economic power, this specific analysis assumes otherwise. In the case of Sino-Zambian
relations, this analysis conceptualizes that neo-colonialism can be experienced when a
developed, imperial, and economic powerhouse, like China, can economically penetrate
(with the assistance of the African state and its ruling elites) and create a dependency
from a lesser developed (and formerly colonized) country, like Zambia. China can be a
neo-colonial force regardless of whether or not Beijing has previously colonized Zambia.
What is more important than whether or not China previously colonized Zambia is
China’s capability of assuming a neo-colonial position of power due to its long-standing
position as an imperial force that has a history of using its foreign policy to extend its
power and influence. Zambia’s neo-dependency upon China has replaced its old Western
model of economic dependency and has gradually shifted upwards China’s position as a
global economic powerhouse. There are a multitude of reasons in which the SinoZambian relationship is perceived as neo-colonial. These reasons span from the Chinese
use of debt-traps, the extraction of raw materials with limited support of local
industrialization, the inherent power imbalance in the relationship, the predatory nature of
purposefully seeking out politically weak countries and the Chinese economy benefiting
more than the Zambian economy. Through this lens, it becomes obvious that Chinese
foreign policy like the One Belt One Road Initiative is a tool to advance neo-dependency
under the guise of aid and solidarity.
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Ultimately, whereas the Sino-Zambian relationship has previously been praised,
over time it has become clear that power is inherently unequally distributed and that
despite promising positive results, Chinese loan-funded urban infrastructure projects in
Lusaka are a tool to deepen Zambia’s crisis of economic development and foster neocolonialism.
Analyzing the Sino-Zambian “All-Weather Friendship” as Neo-colonial
The relationship between China and Zambia has been described as “one of the
richest historical records on China’s cooperation with the [African] continent.” 135
Allegiances between China and Zambia first formed when China supported Zambia
during its fight for independence. After achieving independence from Britain in 1964, the
following three presidents fondly declared an “’all-weather’ friendship,” between the two
countries.136 China first demonstrated its comradery to Zambia when it provided the
country with an alternative to relying on its former colonial power, Britain, for imports
when it funded the construction of the Tazara railway in the 1970s, connecting Zambia to
Tanzania through heavy rail. Since then, Zambia and China have mostly maintained a
positive economic relationship, as China has continuously supplied Zambia with
assistance is its agriculture, healthcare, education, and most relevant, infrastructure
sectors.137 In return, Zambia has remained a close diplomatic ally to China. Zambia
closely supported China in its struggle to reclaim its seat on the United Nations Security
Council in 1971.138 In this regard, the relationship between the two countries can be
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described as symbiotic. They hold a strategic partnership in which they often trade
political backing, natural resources, development potential, and global economic power.
Zambia is often described as “China’s Perfect Storm,” because of it struggles with
democratic consolidation and its commodity-based economy.139 Convincingly
highlighting Beijing’s calculated approach to foreign policy. The Sino-Zambian
relationship was perceived as forward-looking up until 2006, when Zambian politician,
Michael Sata, publicly exposed the discontent Zambian citizens had with the country’s
close relationship with China by campaigning on a platform to rid Zambia of its Chinese
presence. Comprehensively, there are “three phases of the Sino-Zambian relationship,
driven by solidarity, geopolitics, and geo-economics.” 140 This expansive partnership has
managed to entwine the trade, aid, and investment domains into a path for economic
growth and development, which has been made possible through the extraction of raw
materials and the construction of urban infrastructure projects in Zambia’s urban centers.
China’s infrastructure loans to Zambia have been used for building projects such
as roads, railways, sports arena and airports. China is now, “the primary source of new
direct investment in Zambia and has over 140 officially recorded [infrastructure] projects
covering various sectors.”141 Nonetheless, financing urban infrastructure has been a
founding principle of the Sino-Zambian relationship since 1967. In fact, between 1967
(only three years after Zambia declared its independence) and 2006, Chinese loans to
Zambia amounted to roughly ¥1,413 million renminbi.142 However, it was not until the
2000s that the Sino-Zambian relationship through economic engagement gained even
more momentum when “bilateral trade grew from $108 million in 2000 to $1.39 billion
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in 2009 and further to $2.85 billion in 2010, greatly boosted by the dramatic swelling of
China’s copper imports in recent years. By the end of 2010, China was the second-largest
destination for Zambian copper exports.”143 The success of Sino-Zambian economic
engagement in the early 2000s laid the groundwork for the establishment of The ZambiaChina Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) in Lusaka, which was the first Sino-African trade and
economic cooperation zone set up in Africa. Comprehensively, the ZCCZ was built in
Lusaka to further the interests of both China and Zambia. Whereas Beijing wanted to
expand its control over Zambia’s copper reservoirs, Lusaka desperately wanted to form
and develop a manufacturing industry around its mining industry to boost economic
development.144
Zambia’s abundance of natural resources is China’s greatest motive for investing
in Zambia because of the ability to exchange raw materials for the financing of desired
urban infrastructure. China’s “pace of development and rapid depletion of its natural
resources has been a driving force in its international diplomatic relations. Accounting for
the largest population in the world and 5.26% GDP growth in 2011, China’s hunger for
[natural resources] is prevailing in the international market as they demand 17% of the
world’s global consumption. With its demand expected to expand by 75% by 2035,
China is positioning itself to compete aggressively and diplomatically for” the security of
raw materials.145 Zambia finds itself as the primary focus of China’s foreign policy
initiatives in Africa because of the ability to consensually exchange the invigoration the
Zambian economy through manufacturing (through infrastructure) with natural resources
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(backed by the loans). Zambia’s primary raw exports to China are sugar, tobacco, coffee,
and copper.146 Copper has long been the leading motive of China’s interest in Zambia.
Whereas Chinese loan investments in Zambia have gone to a multitude of sectors, the
majority of Chinese companies invest and operate within the mining sector.147 It is
anticipated that soon Lusaka with be China’s “metal hub.”148
China can be perceived as a neo-colonial force in Zambia because of the manner
in which natural resources are extracted, which cultivates the development of
underdevelopment. As previously addressed, China’s appeal to Zambia is its abundance
of natural resources, which has been referred to as the “new scramble for Africa.”149 This
is a clear reference to the original scramble for Africa in which the entire continent was
essentially divided by colonial powers for colonial powers in an effort to extract as many
resources as possible to manufacture within Europe and advance industrialization,
feeding European development. Upon default of One Belt One Road urban infrastructure
loans, as anticipated by the debt-traps, China uses its resource-backed loans to extract
raw materials like copper from Zambia. Manufacturing happens within China, in which
products are brought back into Zambia through the same infrastructure China built for
Zambia. Essentially, “China is swapping its value-added manufactured goods for lowvalue-added and raw commodities from” Zambia.150 With limited manufacturing
happening in Zambia, it is unable to industrialize. The lack of industrialization (and
therefore development) in Zambia is further pursued by China’s interest in building urban
infrastructure that facilities the importation of Chinese goods into Zambian cities, instead
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of the much-needed manufacturing infrastructure. If this process continues Zambia will
be cursed by underdevelopment for a long time. Ultimately, the extraction of raw
materials always feels colonial, especially when it is purposefully disrupting the
development of industrialization. The unequal value in the exchanged materials between
China and Zambia creates an inherently unequal power dynamic that “indicates that SinoAfrican economic relationship is not relations of equals or interdependence, rather it is
relations of unequal or dependence.”151 Zambia is forced into a trade deficit which further
promotes underdevelopment.152 With that being said, despite China’s claim of mutual
benefits, in reality, Zambia has limited bargaining power; it is reliant on China for both
infrastructure development and manufactured goods. This imbalance of power has been
noted by the president of the African Development Bank, Akinwumi Adesina, who
stated, ‘“the issue that I have seen is the asymmetry of power in the negotiations of the
[Sino-Zambian] transactions, where you are actually giving your mining rights away just
because you want to build a superhighway.’”153 The fact of the matter is that China’s neocolonial power in Zambia has not gone unnoticed by other African powers, but nothing
can be done without the initiative of the Zambian government.
The Sino-Zambian relationship is quite controversial both domestically and
internationally. Whereas some people believe that China’s investment in Zambia is
positive because of its ability to provide local people with employment opportunities and
economic development potential, others argue that the Zambian government is giving too
much attention to building grand infrastructure and chooses to ignore the daily struggles
of ordinary Zambians. In an effort to placate domestic and international agents against
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China’s economic integration with Zambia, Chinese President Xi Jinping has previously
offered Zambia US $800 million in soft loans while simultaneously eliminating US $350
million in bilateral debt.154 Unfortunately, since then Zambia has obtained even more
debt, finding itself in somewhat of a debt crisis. As the Zambian government continues to
take out massive loans from Beijing to build urban infrastructure in Lusaka (and other
urban centers throughout Zambia) it struggles to maintain its national debt and balance
debt servicing with the cost of running the state. Zambia has become dependent upon
China to finance infrastructure to generate more economic development to be able to both
operate the country and repay China, but to generate the capital to do so, Zambia feels the
need to build more, which results in becoming even more indebted to China.
This cycle is illustrative of China’s setting of debt-traps; in which it is aware the
Zambian government will undoubtedly struggle to release itself. A debt-trap is the
strategic leveraging of national debt to create dependency by purposefully giving
economically vulnerable countries large loans, knowing that they will not be able to
service those debts. This tactic always results in the indebted countries forcibly giving up
valuable state-assets upon default.155 Globally China’s use of giving excessive credit to
vulnerable countries is so well known that the term “debt-trap diplomacy” has been
constructed to critique its foreign policy strategy. Zambia is no stranger to China’s debttrap diplomacy, in fact, the One Belt One Road Initiative is the main apparatus in which
China was contemporarily able to enter the Zambian economy. Debt-trap diplomacy
through One Belt One Road can be seen in the way in which China’s continuously
provides Zambia with excessive lines of debt to build urban infrastructure, despite not
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having “proper feasibility studies to determine their viability by way of acceptable
internal rate of return thereby saddling the country with excessive debt, resulting in the
country being at risk of debt distress according to IMF.”156 This process renders Zambia
economically dependent on China because it means excessive debt servicing costs that
take away from Zambia’s ability to effectively manage its national budget, inevitably
resulting in taking out more unsustainable lines of credit, further exacerbating the debt
crisis. With that being said, China is very well aware of Zambia’s debt distress and even
offers itself as an alternative source of funding when other world powers shy away from
loaning to Zambia because of its unsustainable borrowing. Conclusively, economic
dependency is the core of neo-colonialism. Nonetheless, to understand Zambia’s current
economic position in relation to its debts to China one must first understand the root of
Zambia’s vulnerability to China, which is directly linked with Zambia’s previous nearly
fifty years of underdevelopment.
Since declaring independence from the British on October 24, 1964, Zambia has
experienced nearly fifty years of underdevelopment. This has resulted in Zambia’s
economic and political vulnerability and willingness to undertake more debt from China
for the sake of development. Most importantly, Zambia’s underdevelopment can be
attributed to Western institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, which have
historically forced the Zambian government to adopt and implement particular neo-liberal
policies that have been extremely detrimental to the country’s economic development and
independence in the past. From the 1970s to the 1980s Zambia was considered a middleincome African country. The country’s per capita income was estimated to be around US
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$500 in the early 1970s, however by the beginning of the 1980s the per capita income
declined to US $300 as a reflection of a declining economy due to increasing
international debts to Western donors. The continuously declining per capita income
corresponded with a decline in living standards, social services, and a lack of ability to
finance and maintain urban infrastructure for the growing population.157 By the 1990s
Zambia’s positioning in the global financial system declined even further. In response,
the World Bank and IMF externally implemented Structural Adjustment Programs
(SAPs), which was “a painful and immiserating [experience for Zambia] marked by
deindustrialization.”158 During this time, SAPs were implemented around the African
continent in efforts to supposedly kickstart economic growth, however in reality, SAPs
assisted in fostering the widespread underdevelopment of many African nation-states that
can be seen today.
Zambia’s SAPs in the 1990s, “reversed the development successes of the 1960s
and 1970s, with millions sliding into poverty every year. Even the World Bank had to
accept the SAPs failed the poor, with a special burden falling on women and children.”159
Zambia’s SAP policies were based on financial and trade liberalization, monetarism,
currency devaluation, a dramatic decrease in social spending (particularly in the
education and poverty reduction sector), the privatization of state assets (such as the
copper mining industry), and the elimination of government subsidies and price
controls.160 Comprehensively, these policies created more underdevelopment within
Zambia. It is possible the country would have been better off managing its post-
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independence public debts independently, rather than with the help of global financial
institutions. The West-imposed SAPs were held responsible for increased inequality
within Zambia, rising unemployment rates, and declining living standards. The Zambian
public responded with civil unrest, which further impeded growth and delegitimized the
Zambian state. 161 By the end of the 1990s and into the early 2000s, there was complete
distrust of Western development solutions by both the government and the people of
Zambia. In response, the Zambian government decided to abandon the externally
imposed SAPs and refused to continue debt servicing to the IMF. In return, nearly every
Western donor temporarily pulled aid from Zambia, which “learned the hard way not to
resist” the World Bank and IMF policies.162 Despite distrusting Western development
solutions, intermittently throughout the 2000s and 2010s Zambia requested development
funding assistance from the IMF because of a need for external funding. In total, Zambia
was issued Eurobonds for nearly US $3 billion. As Zambia took out more loans that it
was unable to repay due to economic crisis and underdevelopment, its creditworthiness
deteriorated resulting in Western institutions becoming reluctant to finance any more debt
for Zambia.163 In the past few years, the IMF has rejected Zambian requests for loans
amounting to approximately US $1.3 billion because “the borrowing plans provided by
the [Zambian] authorities continue to compromise the country’s debt sustainability and
risk undermining its macroeconomic stability.”164 From the Western perspective,
Zambian borrowing for development is risky due to the possibility that the Zambian
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government took out too many loans and is on the brink of debt default and economic
collapse.
Zambia’s chosen and forceful deviation from Western-imposed development
solutions have created rather agreeable circumstances for Sino-Zambian relations to
flourish. Whereas overtime the West has become less likely to give to Zambia due to debt
sustainability, China is more than willing to continuously loan without regard to
Zambia’s debt sustainability. To begin, China offers Zambia an alternative development
model based on non-interference. This policy is appealing to Zambia because it means no
more invasive and destructive externally imposed economic and political policies like
those imposed by the previous SAPs. This means that Zambia can maintain international
funding and investment for development, without having to sacrifice its national
sovereignty and decision-making capabilities. Additionally, loans from China have much
more favorable terms. Chinese loans offer interest rates of about two to three percent,
with nearly fifteen to twenty years given to pay them off, in addition to a five- to sevenyear grace period.165 Additionally, unlike SAPs, the use of Chinese loans has produced
positive and effective change within Zambia’s urban centers such as improving
infrastructure which boosts productivity and economic growth.166 Another reason why
alternative Chinese loan funding is preferential in Zambia is that it provides targeted
funding based on Zambian interests. China is tapping into Zambia’s desire for improved
infrastructure, of which Western funding did not. Whereas “debt was once a symptom of
western capitalist domination, it is now also a sign of China’s grip on countries
desperately in need of infrastructure and procuring funds through non-concessional loans.
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These are now thought to account for 77% of Zambia’s total debt.”167 Lastly, Chinese
loans currently act as a preferred alternative to Western aid as a result of Western
implemented development solutions because they offer more debt relief. Since 2000,
Beijing has taken massive steps to alleviate Zambian debts, in which it “wrote off $1.2
billion in African debt [from thirty-one countries and] in 2003, it forgave another $750
million”168 Overall, by bypassing a colonial legacy and the implementation of SAPs in
Africa, continuing to give infrastructural loans when others refuse, providing better debt
financing, and targeting specific Zambian development interests China has been able to
establish itself as a standout alternative partner to Zambia. The outcome tends to be a lack
of criticism of China, despite the opaque nature of Chinese lending, particularly in terms
of debt sustainability.
Contextualizing Zambia’s Interest in Chinese Infrastructure Investment and its
Urban Implications
The fundamental reason in which Zambia (and the rest of Africa) is willing to
overlook questionable Chinese lending terms is due to the mutual significance China and
Zambia have placed on the improvement of urban infrastructure as a tool of fostering
development and economic stability. Many African countries, Zambia particularly,
struggle with urban infrastructure insufficiency, which generally reduces economic
productivity by nearly forty percent.169 A seemingly simple solution to boosting
productivity and escaping the grip of underdevelopment is building more infrastructure;
nonetheless, “the cost of addressing Africa’s infrastructure shortfalls is estimated at
around US $93 billion annually.”170 Domestically filling Africa’s infrastructure gap is
167
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financially impractical, and very concerning for Zambia because it already trails behind
most of its African counterparts in adequate infrastructure and further burdens the
county.171 Studies show that inadequate infrastructure hinders economic productivity in
Zambia by nearly fifty percent and causes the loss of about US $500 million a year; but,
if the government achieved adequate infrastructure development to the level of middleincome countries, its economic performance could grow by nearly three percent per
capita per year.172 173 Zambia has an infrastructure funding gap of roughly US $500
million a year, which would be a major problem if wasn’t for Beijing’s intervention
through infrastructure loans.174 However, now that Zambia can receive funding from
Beijing, debt sustainability becomes a main concern.
Zambia was one of the earliest African countries to accept infrastructural
investment through loans from Beijing, which has remained a “testimony to the
unbreakable bond shared between Zambia and China.”175 This bond is based on the
mutual value of infrastructure being ‘“an important driver of development for any
country. By improving infrastructure, [Zambia] will not only have economic growth but
also attract [more] investors [because] better and improved infrastructure promotes
sustainable and socially inclusive economic growth,’” as described by the Minister of
Housing and Infrastructure, Ronald Chitotela.176 This perspective has driven the core
objective of Zambia’s current ruling party, the Patriotic Front (PF). The need for outside
funding for infrastructure development explains the rise of Chinese lending in Zambia
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since the party was elected in 2011.177 With the help of China, in virtually a decade the
PF has been able to completely transform the urban infrastructural fabric of Zambia, this
can be easily observed within Lusaka. Nevertheless, research shows that despite China’s
massive lending to build new and improved infrastructure within Zambian cities like
Lusaka, the developments only contributes a mere 0.6 percentage point to the yearly per
capita growth of Zambia’s gross domestic product (GPD).178 With that being said, the
Zambian government borrows more than is sustainable based on development potential,
overlooking the actual data on the real impact of development assistance. The Zambian
government is undoubtedly digging itself into deeper and unbearable debt. Newer urban
infrastructure projects are doing more to beautify Lusaka (and attract international
attention) than they are for the development of the city and the economic well-being of
the country.
Since the beginning of China’s investment in Zambia in the 1960s, the nature of
Chinese lending has changed. The evolving nature of Chinese lending to Zambia can be
observed through the shift in the types (and magnitude) of loans over time, which alludes
to China’s growing self-interest in economically engaging with Zambia. From the late
1960s to 2006, the majority of China’s engagement in Zambia went towards grants on
much-needed relief for Zambia and Sino-Zambian economic and technical cooperation;
the majority of Sino-Zambian engagement during this time was not through loans.
Between 1967 and 2006 China spent a massive amount on technical and economic
cooperation between the two countries, amounting to nearly ¥471 million renminbi.179 In
the same period of time, China gave grants targeting economic relief for Zambia, giving
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nearly ¥20 million renminbi for causes ranging from relief food, cash, equipment,
medicine, and general goods.180 By comparing the sums that China spent on economic
and technical cooperation and relief packages, it becomes clear that Sino-Zambian
economic engagement has always been at the forefront of China’s motivation to engage
with Zambia. Chinese infrastructural loans make up a very small percentage of SinoZambian economic engagement from 1967 to 2006. In those nearly forty years, Beijing
gave Zambia loans for four urban infrastructure projects. The first being the Tazara
railway in 1967 for ¥484 million renminbi, followed by a ¥50 million renminbi loan for
road rehabilitation in 1987, a US $8 million loan for a new government complex in
Lusaka in 1995, and a ¥120.9 million renminbi loan for a new government complex (and
unidentified “special loan”) in 2002.181 These early infrastructure loans represent China’s
realization of the amount of profits that could be made through such lending practices,
signifying a change in China’s investment after the privatization of Zambia’s copper
mines which increased Chinese investment in the 2000s. Such infrastructure development
lending practices can be described as white elephant development, in which China
realized it could foster increased profits through Zambian economic dependence. White
elephant development is urban infrastructure projects in which the initial cost,
maintenance, and debt servicing of the project end up being greater than its local profits.
Perhaps the most illustrative of white elephant development is the Tazara railway. As
previously mentioned, in 1967 China lent ¥484 million renminbi to Zambia to build the
Tazara railway, however, lending didn’t stop there. The maintenance of the Tazara
railway ended up being much more than expected, in which Zambia couldn’t afford and
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needed to continuously request Chinese loans to fund. Only two years after the initial
loan for the construction of the Tazara railway, Zambia received a ¥5.58 million renminbi
loan for twelve locomotives. This is followed by a ¥5 million renminbi loan for spare
parts in 1986, a ¥52 million renminbi loan given to Zambia for Tazara locomotives and
technical training in 1999, and two unspecified loans regarding Tazara amounting to ¥21
million renminbi in 2004 and 2006182 Comprehensively, the Tazara railway cost Zambian
officials nearly ¥83 million renminbi more than initially expected, on top of the original
¥484 million renminbi that the Zambian government couldn’t afford in the first place. By
requiring massive initial investment and continuous borrowing overtime, white elephant
development became Beijing’s primary mechanism to build Zambian debt.
China’s current neo-colonial engagement in Zambia through One Belt One Road
is centered on white elephant development. China’s One Belt One Road projects in
Zambia cost massive initial investment, followed by continuous borrowing for
maintenance and debt servicing, which is greater than Zambian profits made through the
project. Since the inception and implementation of One Belt One Road in 2013, China’s
white elephant development has taken over Lusaka’s urban landscape. In 2013, Zambian
officials borrowed US $300 million for Lusaka’s L400 roads, and in 2014 they borrowed
US $360 million for the renovation of Zambia’s national airport in Lusaka, the Kenneth
Kaunda International Airport.183 The year 2015 was a heavy borrowing year for Zambian
officials as they borrowed US $130 million for the Lusaka sanitation project, US $90
million for the renovation of the Levy Mwanawasa Hospital (Zambia’s national hospital),
US $275 million for a housing project for employees of Zambia’s national security
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department, and US $1.7 billion for the Kafue Gorge Lower Power Plant (90 km outside
of Lusaka).184 Two years later, 2017 was also a heavy borrowing year for Lusaka.
Officials borrowed US $286 million for the Lusaka de-congestion project, US $157
million for the construction of 2,000 military homes, and US $280 million for the
construction of communication towers in Lusaka and around Zambia.185 Honorable
mention of a white elephant infrastructure project funded by Chinese lending slightly
before One Belt One Road is the renovation of Lusaka’s National Heroes Stadium, which
cost US $94 million in 2011. Between 2006 and 2011, Zambia’s previous ruling political
party borrowed extensively, amounting to US $3.5 billion, but little information is given
on where these funds were utilized. 186 Since 2017, Zambia’s borrowing through One
Belt One Road has not slowed down, some might argue that it has picked up.
The construction of these One Belt One Road development projects is done by
Chinese construction companies, which signifies yet another reason in which China is a
neo-colonial force in Zambia. The Chinese economy benefits significantly more than the
Zambian economy, which promotes even more underdevelopment. Considerable
“evidence suggests that a substantial part of concessional loans have been used by China
as a tool to open the gates for Chinese construction” companies in Lusaka.187 As
previously stated in chapter one, the majority of One Belt One Road infrastructure
projects are funded by the China Exim Bank. The bank requires that at least fifty percent
of contractors for the funded project to be Chinese.188 Whereas this could have a positive
impact on Zambian companies by establishing a transfer in skills and technology, it is not
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because “Chinese [companies tend to claim] that they find it very difficult to identify
appropriate African sources and partners for their needs and that project completion and
quality could be compromised in such compliance.”189 Chinese construction companies
import their equipment and labor from China, allowing them to elude the responsibility of
hiring Zambians and working with Zambian companies. Therefore, working-class
Zambians are gaining very little from the actual building of the infrastructure; they are
neither gaining capital which would stimulate the economy from within, nor receiving
any sort of information, skills, or technology transfer in which they could replicate. Yet
again, this fosters the development of underdevelopment in Zambia at the hands of
China. China is not only setting debt-traps to ensure dependency in which it will benefit
in the long-term based on interest payments but also building quick wealth by paying
itself through contracting.190
Conclusively, these projects have visually changed Lusaka’s urban landscape, but
the real concern is if they have fulfilled Zambia’s goals and intentions for the projects.
With these projects, Zambian officials intended to boost development by increasing local
services, quality of life within Lusaka, and global economic connectivity. In reviewing
these intentions, it becomes unfortunately clear that One Belt One Road projects in
Zambia have only improved services and quality of life for middle-class Zambians with
the privilege to live within Lusaka’s formal housing sector, afford vehicles, air travel and
up-to-date technology. These projects do little for ordinary, working-class Zambian’s that
cannot afford these luxuries because they do not have access. As for increasing Zambia’s
global economic connectivity, since 2016 Lusaka has been ranked a gamma city by the
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Globalization and World Cities Research Network after years of honorable mentions as
sufficiency and high sufficiency.191 However, it is not clear as to whether or not it was
specifically Chinese investment that made this possible, or rather the increased FDI from
all of Zambia’s neo-colonial forces (being the West and IFIs). Nevertheless, in choosing
to continue to borrow from China for these One Belt One Road projects, Zambia is
choosing to pursue global economic connectivity and national development over the
improved lives of ordinary Zambians. In focusing on large-scale development made
possible by outside sources of investment, Zambian officials are relying on a trickledown development structure, in which positive effects never actually trickle down to
those at the very bottom.
China’s presence in Lusaka has transformed its urban landscape not only through
the construction of urban infrastructure but also through the construction of suburban
communities in Lusaka’s periphery where the informal settlements mentioned previously
are located. Chinese immigrants tend to reside in Lusaka’s middle- and upper-class
neighborhoods around the city, as well as in gated communities in the city’s suburbs,
such as Lusaka’s Millennium Village.192 The Henan-Guoji Development Company, (the
company that built Millennium Village) has also developed Silverest Gardens, another
gated community only 10 kilometers from Lusaka’s airport. For a grand US $200,000
Silverest Gardens offers its residents its own shopping mall, gym, police station,
landscaping services, home servicing, and waste collection services. The majority of
those that bought homes in Silverest Gardens are international investors, sometimes
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buying nearly a dozen at once. 193 Even if Zambian families were wealthy enough to
purchase homes, they were frequently still excluded for their lack of buying power. In
regard to the services provided within the gated community, life in Silverest Gardens
appears to be completely self-sufficient. Those that live within the community are rarely
ever required to leave, therefore fostering deeper isolation and separation between
residents of Lusaka and Chinese expatriates.
Furthermore, despite claiming community ties in its brochure, Silverest Gardens
will not provide housing for the presumably Zambian blue-collar workers that will be
servicing the homes in the community. The lack of provided housing for these Zambian
service workers will most likely lead to the formation of an informal settlement nearby
because of the need for workers to be able to easily access their places of employment.
However, this will further expose the clear economic inequality because Zambians and
Chinese expatriates, which will most likely cause more tension between the two groups.
The establishment of peri-urban gated communities such as Silverest Gardens does not
only lead to the formation of informal settlements nearby but also has a tendency to
displace established informal settlements. For instance, in June of 2013, the Kampasa
settlement was forcibly removed, with violence, when the land it resided on was sold
without notification to a Chinese development firm.194 Moreover, the growing presence
of gated communities as a result of Chinese investment in Lusaka is raising real estate
prices well beyond the financial capabilities of the ordinary Zambian.195 Through the
destruction of Lusaka’s informal communities at the hands of Chinese development and
construction companies, it becomes clear that mass displacement is a new feature to
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modern neo-colonialism. Conclusively, Chinese investment in peri-urban gated
communities for Chinese expatriates is further dividing Lusaka, which explains the
violent outbursts across the city between Zambians and Chinese residents to be addressed
in chapter three.
Recognizing Zambia’s Agency and its Resulting Economic Isolation
It has been established that China’s expansive lending presence in Lusaka
legitimizes China as a neo-colonial force in Zambia. The Zambian government’s
reluctance to do anything about China’s neo-colonial presence is a reflection of China’s
strategic use of choosing to economically engage with politically weak countries, as well
as the personal agency of Zambian ruling elites, and the Zambian government’s national
agency. Whereas usually African countries that rank highly in political stability attract
high levels of FDI, China takes the opposite approach. Beijing seeks to give the majority
of its FDI to politically weak countries that are underinvested in order to increase
government enthusiasm to comply.196 With that, the bargaining power of Beijing
instantaneously increases due to its leveraging of the Zambian government’s desire for
FDI. In consideration of the foregoing, China’s practice of seeking out politically weak
countries like Zambia is predatory and suggests that China is not choosing its partners
based on positive diplomatic relationships; instead, it is based upon the ability to take
advantage of the local government due to having little bargaining power. Some of
Zambia’s political weakness can be attributed to corruption within the government, in
which “corruption chips away at democracy to produce a vicious cycle, where corruption
undermines democratic institutions and, in turn, weak institutions are less able to control
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corruption.”197 Contemporarily the matter of corruption within the Zambian government
has emerged in the context of FDI because of the exposure of Zambian public officials
and senior cabinet members urging for more FDI “as a resource for private accumulation
at the expense of the public.” 198 Zambian ruling elites’ self-interest in FDI is not specific
to Zambia, as post-colonial African states became one of the very few areas in which
African elites can profit. Corrupt Zambian officials’ self-interest suggests their agency of
personal profit makes them less critical of Chinese FDI. Despite a lack of definite figures
on how much corrupt politicians are able to financially benefit from Chinese FDI, it does
not change the fact that they are motivated by their own personal agency. These corrupt
politicians continue to borrow from China, knowingly placing their own agency above
what is best for the country. Because it is their own interest that assists in advancing
Chinese FDI, these Zambian officials are not passive victims of China’s foreign policy.
This goes to say that China’s interest in and engagement with Zambia is not a reflection
of historically rooted positive diplomatic relations (as has been falsely advertised), but
instead by China’s ability to build economic dependency and impose neo-colonial
policies partially because of the financial greed of corrupt Zambian elites to
independently profit from China’s investment.
Aside from the personal agency of Zambian governing elites, China’s neocolonial presence is to a certain extent, the exertion of the Zambian government’s
national power. Currently, Zambia finds itself in a no-win situation based on the
excessive and seemingly uncontrollable debts the country owes to Western powers,
global financial institutions and China (along with other BRICS countries that have
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provided FDI). Despite the mass construction of urban infrastructure, the country is still
unable to achieve the development it so desperately desires and needs for economic
independence because it is borrowing at greater rates than the economy is able to grow.
Zambia’s excessive national debt renders the country to inevitably be economically
dependent, with the prospect of economic independence anytime soon being low. Having
said that, from the Zambian perspective, there are enough external powers that are willing
to give much more funding to Zambia than the country is able to repay, therefore by
choosing who to economically engage with, the Zambian government is exerting its
decision-making power. This is not to be confused with the idea that Zambia is choosing
to be economically colonized, as that is not the case. Zambia’s economic dependency has
long been determined by exterior forces reaching as far back into its colonization.
However, if a neo-colonial presence is inevitable because economic independence is not
feasible, then choosing which neo-colonial force Zambia prefers becomes an empowering
bargaining tool of the Zambian government. Whereas it is unfortunate that economic
dependency is the reality of the Zambian economy, it is critical to comprehend that by
presenting China as a monstrous neo-colonial force in Zambia, in which the Zambian
government has limited control over, one is feeding into the oversimplified narrative that
Zambia (and more generally speaking, Africa) is the timeless victim of globalization. In
reality, the Zambian government is voluntarily seeking out more debt from China, despite
redundant warnings that the country is on the brink of a debt crisis, to fulfill its political
and economic objectives. Asserting that China is taking advantage of the alleged naïveté
of Zambian officials neglects to take into account the Zambian government’s agency.
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Under that oversimplified assumption, the Zambian government is unaware of the debt
obligations it has agreed to undertake, which is not true. The argument that Zambia’s
neo-colonialism is contingent upon its own agency does not relieve China of
responsibility for the predatory nature of its foreign economic policy in the way that it
takes advantage of underdevelopment and falsely claims mutual benefit. However, it
acknowledges that the neo-colonial relationship between China and Zambia requires
voluntary commitment on both sides. Just as the Chinese government should be held
liable to rein in its predatory neo-colonial foreign policy, the Zambian government should
be held responsible for asserting its agency in a manner that continuously negatively
affects ordinary Zambians for the sake of development, as will be discussed in the
following chapter.
The Sino-African relationship, particularly when referencing foreign aid, cannot
be discussed without mentioning the Western (European and American) influence and
perspective. This is because China’s first economic engagement in Africa stemmed from
an African “aid war” between China, the United States Peace Corps, and the Soviet
Union.199 The competition between China and the West over Africa through debt
financing continues contemporarily. China currently leads the way after having replaced
“traditional Western lenders as the region’s largest creditor, accounting for 14% of subSaharan Africa’s total debt stock. This shift was informed by both a focus on
infrastructure development by African governments and China’s [over] willingness to
lend on the continent.”200 As the Sino-African relationship becomes more deeply
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entrenched through debt financing and bilateral trade, Western, particularly United
States-African, bilateral trade, and debt financing steeply declines.201
Furthermore, when conceptualizing Western and Chinese presence on the African
continent as neo-colonial, the rivalry between China and the West increases. Despite the
fact that “the West has never been a friend of Africa and has never been interested in its
development but rather wanted to perpetuate dependency,” it is highly critical of the
Sino-African relationship.202 Western critiques of China in Africa tend to be Sino-phobic,
relying on long-standing rhetoric that China is a predatory force that neither cares about
the economic development of African state nor cares about the human rights of Africans.
Nevertheless, these critiques of China in Africa are hypocritical because the Western
presence in Africa has long been driven by its national economic interests, not by its
supposed noble pursuit of improving human rights on the continent. It is not just Western
nation-states that are critical of Sino-African relations. The IMF and World Bank hold
similar hypocritical beliefs.203 It is nonsensical for the IMF and World Bank to critique
China in Africa for doing the same thing that they have done for decades in Africa, which
is, “providing unsustainable loans to countries in need to further plunge them into debt,
weaken state capacity and open up national economies to international investors.”204
However, it is important to note that both institutions, despite being global entities, are
Western-led. Seemingly Western powers have forgotten the detrimental influences they
have had on the African continent, the most obvious being enslavement and colonization.
It was the implementation of these catastrophic forces that originally fostered the
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underdevelopment of Africa, which still haunts the continent today. The long-endured
underdevelopment of Africa is what makes the continent vulnerable to Chinese economic
influence in the first place. In reality, Western critiques of Sino-African relations are a
reflection of China being a threat to the United States hegemony and the fear that China
will enable African nations, such as Zambia, to free themselves from Western debt and
political influence. Comprehensively, the West (both nation-states and institutions) is
afraid of losing its grip on Zambia in what has been described as the new scramble for
Africa. The Eastern and Western rivalry for Zambia’s economic dependence further
propels China’s embeddedness in Zambia. China relies on increasing Chinese hegemony
in Zambia to slowly but surely push other forces out of Zambia. China’s presence in
Zambia doesn’t just isolate it from the West, but also the rest of Africa. Zambia’s curated
dependence on China through the One Belt One Road Initiative interrupts intra-African
trade because Zambia trades more with China than its African counterparts. Whereas
intra-regional trade percentages in the European Union, Asia, and North America are
above thirty percent, intra-African trade remains a low ten percent. 205 China’s presence
in Africa, mainly possible through One Belt One Road, externally disrupts African
economic and political integration by placing itself in the center of the African economy.
It seems fair to say that China’s presence in Zambia’s urban centers does more
undermining of the economy than it does to boost.
China’s presence in Lusaka in indeed neo-colonial because of how it utilizes
foreign policy to promote its economic agenda in the wake of Zambia’s economic
dependency by fostering debt-traps and underdevelopment. Economic dependency for
Zambia anytime soon is a bleak prospect. With that being said, it is critical that the
205

Aniche, 24-25.

72

analysis of Zambia’s neo-colonization takes into account that China’s presence is the
exertion of the Zambian government’s power. Out of all of the external forces that are
interested in taking advantage of its economic vulnerability, Zambia is choosing to
cooperate with China because of mutual interests. This is important because it allows
space to recognize Zambia’s agency, instead of perpetuating African countries as
permanent victims in the global order. In that regard, it is clear that China has a distinct
strategy for Zambia, but Zambia lacks a finite strategy for China. I propose that it is only
when Zambia defines a specific approach for its Chinese affairs that there will be a
chance to level out the unequal nature of the Sino-Zambian relationship. Zambia’s lack of
strategy is what allows Western narratives of Zambia is a victim to drown out Zambia’s
agency. Especially when in reality these Western powers are spreading Sino phobic
narratives, despite also using foreign policy to foster neo-colonialism in Zambia.
Presently, aid operates as “merely a revolving credit, paid by the neo-colonial master,
passing through the neo-colonial State and returning to the neo-colonial master in the
form of increased profits.”206 At the forefront of the Zambian government’s agenda
should be two main objectives. The first being to find a way to achieve debt
sustainability. It is predicted by the end of 2020 Zambia’s sovereign debt will reach
ninety-six percent of its GDP, despite defaulting on a multitude of loans in 2019.207 There
desperately needs to be a way to breakdown Zambia’s debt to find a sustainable way to
repay, however, this would require not taking out any more debt, which does not seem to
be an alluring option to the government. Secondly, the Zambian government needs to
find a way to effectively communicate how Chinese loan-funded urban infrastructural
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projects will benefit the ordinary Zambian because ss of now, there is great fragmentation
between the Zambian government and its people. A large part of making things right with
the Zambian public would require altering the clauses in Sino-Zambian agreements to
ensure that productivity for the Zambian economy is written into dealings. All in all,
there is potential for an evening of the power dynamics of Sino-Zambian relations,
particularly for the building of infrastructure in Lusaka. However, the Zambian
government needs to be more proactive in making sure its own needs are being met.
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Investors or “Infesters”?: Social Fragmentation and the Rise of
Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Lusaka
“’We've had bad people here before. The whites were bad, the Indians worse, but the Chinese are
worst of all.’”208

After independence in 1964, Zambia’s first President, Kenneth Kaunda, referred
to Sino-Zambian relations as an “all-weather friendship”.209 This enthusiastic sentiment
has been repeated by proceeding presidents in efforts to defend deeper economic
engagement with China. The positive political and civil portrayal of China became a
point of friction in 2006 when the “national elections marked a clear point of departure
and introduced a new element to the picture: political and popular opposition to
China.”210 Political representation came as a response to the widespread dissatisfaction of
the Sino-Zambian relationship by Zambian residents. Despite cohesive macro-level
engagement, on the micro-level, China’s presence in Zambia, particularly in urban
centers like Lusaka, was and continues to be, a point of friction and discontent. It became
clear that the Zambian public does not value China’s longstanding presence as highly as
the previous governments. The reason is, whereas Zambia was able to capitalize on
China’s engagement by strengthening its political status, very little has been done to
improve the lives of ordinary Zambians. The failure of Chinese investment to benefit
residents highlights an oversight on the research of the Sino-Zambian relationship.
Whereas much research focuses on international economic implications, very little
attention is given to the local implications and perceptions.
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In this regard, it has become clear that Lusaka’s growing Chinese presence has
begun to agitate locals resulting in xenophobia and national political tension.211 Local
tensions within Lusaka have become increasingly intense. Since 2006, the Zambian
capital has become one of the most contentious points of Chinese opposition in Africa,
with increasing instances of anti-Chinese looting, rioting, protesting.212 This xenophobic
violence targets the Chinese nationals that have immigrated to Zambia by the thousands
in the wake of increasing Chinese investment. In support of my analysis, Zambians in
Lusaka tend to perceive China as a dominant force which results in great friction between
the Zambian and Chinese populations. This friction is further exacerbated by the media
and the Patriotic Front, a political party that used anti-Chinese frustrations as a “central
rallying” issue in the 2006, 2008, and 2011 presidential elections. The combination of
agitation from the media and Patriotic Front results in anger being misdirected at Chinese
nationals in Lusaka, instead of the origins of anti-Chinese frustrations, which are the
Chinese and Zambian governments. Whereas Zambians are frustrated with China’s
perceived “take over” of their country, they are equally upset at Zambian officials for
allowing China to do so.213
Zambian Perceptions of China as a Neo-colonial Force in Lusaka
The Zambian government “finds itself as a crossroads in its development path.
For years Zambians have grown more and more frustrated with how their government has
conducted its relationship with Beijing, with many believing that [Zambian government
has] allowed Chinese companies to flaunt national legislation to the detriment of the local
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populations development.”214 Chinese investment in Zambia facilitated increased copper
prices and the revival of the mining industry, the backbone of the Zambian economy.215
This shift to favorable economic conditions should translate into increased quality of life
for Zambians, but it does not. Ordinary Zambian citizens do not receive quality
redistributive effects. In 2019, Zambia ranked 143 out of 189 countries on the Human
Development Index, bringing into question whether or not China’s FDI has any positive
impact on Zambian quality of life.216
Drawing on a three-month field study from December 2011 to February 2012 in
Zambia, researchers asked the questions: “What positive impact does the presence of
Chinese people in Zambia have on Zambia?” and “What negative impacts do Chinese
people in Zambia have on Zambia?”217 The results showed that although there is no
definite benchmark to determine fixed levels of prejudice, there is a general anti-Chinese
sentiment. Slightly over fifty percent of the participants expected to dislike Chinese
migrants; “this implies that even though there is no real dislike for Chinese people among
respondents, it cannot be argued that there is not a general fondness of them either.”218
Zambians’ issues with Chinese people stems from an antipathy of the Chinese
government’s power over the Zambian government, which results in negative
implications of the lives of ordinary Zambians.
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As previously mentioned, in support of my analysis, many Zambians in Lusaka
tend to perceive China as a dominating and predatory force in Zambia, which manifests
in animosity between Zambians and Chinese nationals. Although many Zambians do not
have the scholarly vocabulary to directly label China as neo-colonial, they acknowledge
China as employing cultural, political, and economic hegemony over Zambia, in which
Zambia is being taken over by China. Essentially, many Zambians acknowledge China as
fitting a neo-colonial definition, without actually explicitly calling China neo-colonial.
With that being said, the sentiment of neo-colonialism is just as important as directly
identifying China as neo-colonial.
One of the primary reasons ordinary Zambians feel that China is taking over
Zambia is the increasing visual signs of China’s presence and economic integration and
dependency. For instance, as a result of an asset-backed loan, the Zambian government is
very close to being forced to hand over ZESCO, the nation’s electricity company,
because of an inability to service the debt that paid for ZESCO’s national infrastructure.
Regardless of whether or not the Chinese government repossesses ZESCO, many
Zambians in Lusaka suffer from 20-hour per day power cuts due to the inability to
financially sustain the company.219 Similar fears plague the future of Zambia’s national
airport, the Kenneth Kaunda International Airport in Lusaka, because of an inability to
service the Chinese debt that paid for the airport.220 China taking over Zambia’s national
assets would mean that ordinary Zambians would be putting their money into the pockets
of the Chinese government - as is already the case with Zambia’s broadcasting system,
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ZNBC, which was repossessed by China because of an asset-backed loan.221
Additionally, as of mid-2018, Zambians were reliably informed that nearly half of all
property taxes paid from selling a house goes to the Chinese government for national debt
servicing.222 The increasing visual of Zambians putting their money into the pockets of
the Chinese government enforces Zambian beliefs that China is taking over the country’s
economy.
Furthermore, Zambians growing frustration with China’s ever-increasing visual
presence in Zambia is also fueled by an increase in Chinese people in traditionally
exclusively Zambian spaces. In December of 2017, the Zambian police force employed
eight Chinese nationals as police offices in Lusaka. This came as a great indignity to
Zambians; there was so much protest in the following twenty-four hours that the Chinese
officers were fired before their first day on duty.223 Zambians in Lusaka were insulted by
the appointed Chinese police officers because they felt China was taking over Zambian
sovereignty. One Lusaka resident explained, “‘when we see a uniform of the police, it
signifies our identity. It signifies our sovereignty. How would we be feeling to see a
police officer and be saluting a Chinese [national] in our own country?’”224 The belief is
that only Zambians should police Zambians, not outsiders. In fact, “not even Zambians
with dual-nationality are allowed to join the police,”225 because they are still an agent of
an outside country. The visual that China is taking over Zambia can also be seen in the
Chinese-built special economic zone in Lusaka in which banks use the Chinese renminbi
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instead of Zambia’s national currency, the kwacha.226 Similarly to the police uniform, the
national currency is a representation of sovereignty. To Zambians, the visual of the
Chinese renminbi at a bank in Zambia alludes to diminishing sovereignty and a clear
reminder of Chinese hegemony in Lusaka. Another traditionally exclusively Zambian
space in Lusaka that Zambians feel the increasing Chinese presence is the Soweto
Market, the backbone of the informal economy in Lusaka. Chinese sellers import Chinese
products that can be sold at lower prices than African products, therefore “local
traders…find themselves undercut and displaced by Chinese imported products.”227 One
Lusaka resident explained “that ‘the recent arrival of Chinese traders in the grimy alleys
of Soweto market in Lusaka [has] halved the cost of chicken. Cabbage prices dropped by
65%... ‘How dare the Chinese disturb our market.’”228 This results in “disputes and
threat[s] that are often seen as a cause for prejudice and ethnic conflict.”229 Xenophobia
becomes an outlet for expressing disgruntlement of China’s perceived takeover of
Lusaka.
The second reason ordinary Zambians feel that China is a neo-colonial force in
Zambia is the abominable working conditions for Zambian miners, which has been
compared to slavery. Previously a job in the copper mines ensured better living standards
for Zambian families; workers used to be able to support their family in Lusaka and
extended family in rural Zambia.230 With the rise of Chinese-owned mines, this is no
longer the case. Zambian miners work long hours in atrocious conditions without
personal protection equipment, leaving them exposed to harsh gases and chemicals.
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Additionally, the majority of Zambian mine employees are not given permanent
contracts, instead they work on rolling and fixed-term contracts, ultimately making
employment volatile and inconsistent.231 Lastly, violence against Zambians by Chinese
employers and the lack of action taken by the Chinese government fuels Zambian antiChinese notions that the Chinese are a neo-colonial force in Zambia. Anti-Chinese
tensions “are a reaction to [the] Chinese scramble for Africa’s resources and the
exploitative work conditions instituted by its firms. A few have gone to call China a new
colonial power in Africa.”232 Aside from the notes of colonialism as expressed by
Zambian miners, Zambian frustrations come from feeling as though China is changing
aspects of Zambian life. Mining, which was once a reliable source of sufficient income
has evolved into an unnecessarily dangerous and unstable job, leaving many Zambian
families stranded with limited options.
As resentment of China’s predatory presence in Zambia becomes more outwardly
expressed, Zambians that are not “directly affected by the Chinese, may become
predisposed against Chinese people.” 233 Legitimate conflicts over the exploitative nature
of the Sino-Zambian relationship mix with cultural differences to create negative
“perceptions of Chinese people that have become embedded in the Zambian mind.”234
Ultimately, the xenophobic anti-Chinese sentiment in Lusaka does not stem from racism,
but governmental frustrations. Xenophobia is simply an easily accessible tool to take out
Zambian frustrations with the Chinese government; Chinese nationals in Lusaka become
scapegoats for the Chinese government.
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“Zambia for Zambians”: Local Politics and the Media’s Influence on Rising AntiChinese Sentiments in Lusaka
As previously stated, Zambia was one of the earliest African countries in which
Chinese presence became a robust political issue.235 Michael Sata and his party, the
Patriotic Front (PF) escalated in profile during Zambia’s 2006 presidential election. Sata
had a long-standing political career in Zambia after starting as the District Governor of
Lusaka from 1985 to 1988.236 He developed a reputation as a combative problem-solver,
unafraid of any opponent; and his 2006 campaign for presidency stayed true to his
character. Sata’s campaign “reflected on popular urban frustrations in the run-up to the
election. Such frustrations were dominated by a feeling of neglect, with many Zambians
believing that they had obtained little benefits from the post-2000 commodities boom and
blamed the Chinese for worsening labor conditions and political corruption.”237
Ultimately, Sata exploited wide-spread Zambian dissatisfaction with China’s neocolonial presence, while also inflaming them for his political power gain. He became the
harshest critic of Chinese investment in Zambia, resulting in his party winning “every
single urban parliamentary seat in the Copperbelt Province where the impacts of
privatization were most intensely felt.”238 Truth be told, Sata was against all FDI into
Zambia; however the Chinese were the largest targets of his verbal attacks because their
deep economic engagement and presence in Zambia cited them as the foreign investor of
the country. The association with foreign investment and China has to do with Beijing
investing “heavily in copper mining, which is central to the Zambian economy and
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identity…[as well as] particularly terrible accidents and publicized instances of worker
unrest…have taken place in Chinese-owned mines.”239 In Sata’s 2006 campaign “he
emphasized his opposition to China’s investments because of their negative labor rights
record, poor conditions of service, lack of adherence to environmental standards, and the
fact that Chinese investors engaged in petty trade which eliminated the market for
Zambian small businessmen.” 240 However, he also relied on depicting racist stereotypes
of Chinese migrants in Africa, playing on the fact that cultural differences and
xenophobia were easy tools of Zambian citizens to take out their frustrations with the
Chinese government. He publicly commented on “Chinese people's dirty hygiene and
eating habits to their alleged plans to conquer the world and even allegations of
Satanism.”241 The PF appropriated the Zambian employment concerns raised earlier to
gain votes and further push an aggressive narrative that China was a neo-colonial force in
Zambia that needed to be stopped as soon as possible. He referred to the Chinese in
Zambia as “infesters” instead of investors and denounced them for infesting Zambia by
“bringing in their people to push wheelbarrows instead of hiring local people.” 242243 244
245

With that being said, promised the large-scale deportation of Chinese nationals

residing in Zambia, vowing that “’this country [Zambia] belongs to Zambians.’” 246 247
All in all, Sata ran on the platform that “Zambia [had] become a province of China” and
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publicly pushed that the only way the problem could be solved was by voting him into
office.248
Zambia’s urban centers, including Lusaka, were moved by Sata’s PF presidential
campaign, as explained by their high Chinese presence. Despite this, Michael Sata lost
the 2006 presidential election to Levy Mwanawasa of the Movement for Multi-Party
Democracy (MMD); Sata only received 29.37 percent of the national vote, which was
counted as 804,748 total votes.249 Nevertheless, the 2006 presidential election “marked a
high watermark for the expression of democratic opinion in Zambia. A new electoral roll
significantly increased the number of registered voters to 3,941,229. There was also a
particularly high turnout of seventy-one percent.”250 Sata found one of the most
contentious issues in Zambian politics, exploited urban Zambian frustrations of the neocolonization of their cities, and “created an unprecedented situation in Zambia: the party
that lost the electoral battle is winning the political war.”251 Combative rhetoric and
violent protests of China as an unwanted neo-colonial presence in Zambia soared.
The 2006 presidential campaign was not the last of Michael Sata and the PF’s
anti-Chinese campaign platform. Two years later in 2008, Michael Sata campaigned for
Zambian presidency after the death of President Mwanawasa. Sata ran on the same
platform as his 2006 presidency, only in 2008 he took it even further. Sata vowed to
recognize Taiwan if elected and even referring to the state as a sovereign state. Breaking
its longstanding and deeply rooted policy of non-interference, the Chinese ambassador to
Zambia, Li Baodong, responded saying, “’We shall have nothing to do with Zambia if
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Sata wins the elections and goes ahead to recognize Taiwan,’” a clear exertion of Chinese
power over Zambia.252
Sata lost the 2008 election and ran again in 2011, again under the same antiChinese investment platform. By 2011 the anti-Chinese sentiment had soared throughout
Zambia with increased Chinese investment and economic dependency, and Sata won the
Zambian presidency. For the first time in decades, China was unsure of the future of the
Sino-Zambian relationship.253 It soon became clear, however, that China had nothing to
worry about. After being sworn in, Sata became disloyal to his supporters, drastically
going back on his pledge to rid Zambia of its Chinese neo-colonial power. Sata publicly
declared, “’don’t blame the Chinese, blame yourself because the Chinese are willing to
work.’” 254 With Sata as president, the Sino-Zambian relationship strengthened despite
the public’s opposition, as people were negatively impacted by the increase in Chinese
FDI and expatriate presence. In the end, despite strengthening the Sino-Zambian
economic dependency relationship, Sata’s exploitation of urban Zambia’s frustrations
with China profoundly deteriorated the relationship between Chinese investors and
Zambian workers.255 Overall, by accentuating the exploitative and neo-colonial nature of
the Sino-Zambian relationship and exacerbating urban Zambian resentments towards
China, Michael Sata was able to nationalize the issue of China’s presence in Zambia. Sata
played on nationalism and elevated Zambian residents’ fear and uncertainty about their
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future into a full-fledged anti-Chinese attitude, in which he was often criticized for
inciting violent anti-Chinese protests.256
Sata’s campaign planted the seeds of Zambian xenophobia against the Chinese,
and the Zambian media has kept it alive. The position that China represents a neocolonial presence in Zambia is shared and developed within the Zambian media. Taking
into account that many news and media outlets are government-owned, to acquire the
uncensored opinions of the neo-colonial nature of the Sino-Zambian relationship, this
chapter analyzes opinion pieces by Zambian writers from multiple Zambian news
agencies from between 2016 and 2020. Generally, op-eds in Zambian news sources
directly address the country’s debt distress and economic dependency on China. Zambian
writers tend to address the lack of debt transparency as the failure of the Zambian
government. One writer explains, “there is a severe lack of transparency over many key
questions, including repayment, contracting obligations, project feasibility, value for
money and loan security. This lack of transparency makes it impossible to have a clear
account of the implications of this borrowing for the public finances”.257 Zambian Op-ed
writers make up for the lack of the Chinese and Zambian transparency on the predatory
debt-distress Zambia is under. One writer clearly explains, “the ambitious infrastructure
program has contributed to the budget deficit, huge public debt, kwacha depreciation,
high inflation, high-interest rates, economic corruption and the loss of investor
confidence.”258 The author gives his reader significantly more transparent information
than the Zambian government provides its people. Ultimately, by doing so such writers
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contextualize the experiences of their readers for them, giving formal explanations for the
dire situations ordinary Zambians have recently found themselves in and did not know
why because of opaque information from the government. Zambian op-ed writers are
well aware of their responsibility to properly educate Zambians on the country’s
economic position. One writer in particular, acknowledges the widespread lack of
accurate information, beginning their article by saying, “most Zambians do not
understand the main reason why our economic situation has deteriorated astronomically
in the last four years and are unable to put a finger on one major cause,” and then goes on
to contextualize Zambia’s current neo-colonization.259 The writers of these op-eds make a
point to hold Zambia accountable for lack of transparency and deepening its economic
dependence on China. Besides protests and op-eds, there are no other ways that Zambians
speak out against the Zambian government for its culpability in worsening its economic
situation. Whereas violence against Chinese nationals represents frustrations with the
Chinese government, it would be nonsensical for Zambians to be violent against other
Zambians to release frustrations against the Zambian government. This would foster even
more urban fragmentation in a time when Zambians are working within a nationalist
framework to expel an outsider (China) from its country.
Additionally, op-ed writers take an aggressive approach to framing China as a
neo-colonial power in Zambia; they use contentious, bold, and politically charged
vocabulary to uphold China as a neo-colonial power. One writer blatantly states that “the
Zambian debt is like a cancer.”260 Another writer vigorously warns Zambians that “our
future generations will be economic slaves of the Chinese. The Chinse debt is a full trap,
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that’s why it’s easy to get. [President] Lungo and [his administration] should realize that
power is limited but bad decisions can last forever and affect many.”261 Another approach
that Zambian op-ed writers take to further push the notion of China as a neo-colonial
power is to promote Chinese projects as anti-Zambian in the way that they assert power
over the Zambian people in Lusaka. For instance, when the eight Chinese officers were
appointed to the Lusaka police force, one writer wrote that “Chinese police…in Zambia
was the initial signs of the Chinese government taking over Zambia.”262 Another writer
addressed the increased surveillance presence as a result of Chinese road construction in
their op-ed. They explain that when a Chinese construction company builds a road they
always include surveillance cameras at intersections, of which the footage is kept and
controlled by the Chinese government. The author uses the increased surveillance in
Lusaka to frame Chinese road projects as anti-Zambian. The writer explains, ‘“these spy
cameras are visible all over Lusaka and billions [have] been spent on this anti-people
project. Not only is this place barbaric, it’s wasteful and more importantly, it gives the
security of Zambia in the hands of China. These cameras are controlled by Chinese
agencies.”263 Ultimately, this writer’s approach frames road construction, a major driver
in China’s One Belt One Road initiative in Zambia, as a tool of neo-colonialism.
Comprehensively, these approaches by Zambian writers support their analysis of
China as a neo-colonial force in Zambia through economic engagement and promote
China as the enemy of Zambians. Some writers explain the fact that Zambian animosity
should go towards the Chinese government. One in particular ends his argument by
writing, “Please note that, we the people of Zambia [should] love the Chinese people. But
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we do not want to be ruled by the Chinese government.”264 Unfortunately, more times
than not this sentiment is lost in translation, and the anger Zambians have for the Chinese
government is taken out on Chinese residents in Lusaka. With its aggressive rhetoric, the
media exacerbates the frustrations of Zambian residents, which then become full-fledged
anti-Chinese attitudes to perpetuate violence both online and in the streets. In one op-ed
the writer addressed President Lungo’s comment on the Chinese being cockroaches
therefore the Zambian people should give up on protesting their presence. In response,
the author disagreed with Lungo and insisted the Zambian people fight on. The comments
section of the said article was filled with an abundance of comments calling the Chinese
cockroaches that need to be exterminated. One comment states, “In other words
[President] Lungu is saying it’s okay for Zambians to live with cockroaches…but my late
grandmother and father taught me to kill them, If I see one, I step on it, if see many I use
insect killer, cockroaches are never partners in development.”265 This commenter’s
aggressive rhetoric is very dangerous. Rhetoric that associates a particular group to
undesirable creatures and animals has historically been used to perpetuate violence
against that group. Equating Chinese nationals to cockroaches is dehumanizing and
suggests that there is violence is brewing with an outbreak on the horizon.
The consensus seems to be that looting and attacking Chinese nationals and their
businesses “is a reflection of growing anti-China sentiment in Zambia, much of it fanned
by a polarized media. Local tabloids carry headlines such as: "China has controlled our
economic lifeline." Or "Chinese have deprived us of our jobs and livelihood." Or "They
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do not respect us. They only want to make money."266 This statement is supported by the
fact that Zambian media plays an important “role in distorting views of the Chinese,
because…Zambian journalists ‘emotionally attach themselves to the cause of the
[Zambian] people’. For the respondents in [a] survey sample, newspapers and television
ranked second (27.2%) as [Zambians] most important source of information on Chinese
people and their activities in Zambia, behind personal experience or personal observation
(46%).”267 Through this media analysis it is clear that the anti-Chinese sentiment in
Lusaka is aggravated by the Zambian media in op-eds, which results in prejudiced and
xenophobic attacks. Fear-induced nationalism sparks these anti-Chinese attacks.
Essentially, Zambians channel their frustrations with the Chinese government into
violence against Chinese nationals in Lusaka.
In conclusion, local tensions in Lusaka and other urban Zambian centers have
become increasingly intense as China’s neo-colonial power over Zambia dramatically
increases with Zambia’s continuous borrowing and deepening debt distress. These neocolonial frustrations have been exacerbated by the Zambian media (through opinion
pieces) and political parties to a boiling point, in which a general anti-Chinese sentiment
has emerged. This anti-Chinese sentiment has manifested into bursts of violence, civil
unrest, and protest. It is important to consider xenophobic anti-Chinese attacks as
grounded in decades of growing anger and resistance towards China’s neo-colonial
presence in Zambia, with Chinese nationals acting as scapegoats for Zambians. As
Zambia continues to unsustainably borrow from China in the wake of widespread
disapproval from its people, it is inevitable that there will be ever-increasing social
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fragmentation of Lusaka and other Zambian urban centers. Nevertheless, by exercising
their right to protest Zambian residents are challenging the narrative that the urban poor is
powerless. While there has never been an organized anti-Chinese movement in Zambia
(with the exception of the rise of Michael Sata and the PF) increasing Zambian
opposition to its government’s choices begs the questions whether or not a massive antiChinese movement will take place across the country, or if the Zambian government will
eventually listen to its people. In previous instances of national protest, the government
has renegotiated public policy and tax policy; perhaps under the right amount of pressure,
it will renegotiate relations with China.268 Nonetheless, it will be much more difficult for
Zambian officials to restructure China’s neo-colonial FDI because of Zambia’s economic
dependence. No matter how anti-Chinese investment Zambian officials are, the SinoZambian relationship will put up a fight because of how deeply intertwined Zambia’s
economy is with China’s. For instance, Michael Sata extensively used anti-Chinese
rhetoric when campaigning for the presidency. However, once in office he adhered to
policy that was subservient to China. This implies that breaking away from economic
integration with China is much more of a challenge than anticipated, reinforcing that
China is a neo-colonial force in Zambia. This is not to say that Zambia must disengage
with Chinese FDI; Chinese FDI simply needs to be restructured and funneled into
poverty mitigation and social services. If not, ordinary Zambians will never see the
benefits of the Sino-Zambian relationship.
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Conclusion
China’s long-standing relationship with Zambia laid the groundwork for its neocolonization of the country. Zambia’s economic vulnerability to predatory Chinese
lending practices began when China first established itself as a Global South ally during
Zambia’s decolonization process in the 1960s and 1970s through the financing of the
Tanzanian-Zambian heavy rail. The Sino-Zambian relationship was strengthened even
more in the 1980s and 1990s when Zambia became even more economically vulnerable
as a result of the damaging SAPs enforced in Zambia by IFIs. Zambia’s economic
dependency on China intensified in the 2000s when China began strategically employing
the neo-colonial process of Flexigemony to solidify its place as Zambia’s most prominent
and leading economic partner. China used Zambia’s desire for development through
infrastructure as a bargaining chip to fulfill its economic agenda.
Since One Belt One Road was established by President Xi Jinping in 2013, it has
become the brand for China’s foreign policy. One Belt One Road has also become the
primary tool of neo-colonization in Zambia by disguising debt-traps as friendship and
mutual benefit in order to build economic dependency while building infrastructure in
Lusaka. Currently, China is the primary neo-colonial presence in Zambia, closely
followed by Western countries and institutions. Prospects of Zambia achieving economic
independence anytime soon are grim. Zambia’s decision to prioritize and prefer Chinese
lending must be recognized as the enforcement of the country’s national sovereignty and
the Zambian government’s decision-making power. It is imperative to understand this
exertion of power as Zambia’s responsibility for its continuous declining economic
status. Holding the Zambian government partially responsible for currently aiding in the
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process of China’s tightening grip on the country’s economy by no means blames the
Zambian government for its neo-colonization. Holding the Zambian government
responsible establishes the government as capable of helping its economy by stopping
senseless borrowing for white elephant infrastructure projects that do not benefit local
people and only work to increase Zambia’s debt.269 In light of this, it is important to
recognize that working with China is the Zambian government’s best effort at making the
best of its no-win economic status.
In this thesis, I’ve used the concept of neo-colonialism, an unequal economic
relationship, in framing the cohesive macro-level engagement between China and
Zambia. On the micro-level, the Sino-Zambian relationship cultivates urban
fragmentation in Lusaka due to the lack of improvement to living standards, perceptions
of Chinese hegemony, the displacement of peri-urban informal communities at the hands
of Chinese developers building gated communities for Chinese expatiates, resulting in a
growing anti-Chinese sentiment that blurs the line between patriotism and xenophobia.
The growing anti-Chinese sentiment in Lusaka is not rooted in racism, but geopolitics. As
Lusaka residents grow more frustrated with the impacts of the Sino-Zambian relationship,
they use xenophobia as a tool to scapegoat and villainize Chinese nationals living in
Zambia. Zambian politicians like Michael Sata in 2006, 2008, and 2011, heightened these
complex feelings held by Lusaka residents in order to gain political control. At the same
time, Zambian media, in the form of op-eds and letters to the editors of news outlets, also
exacerbated and aggravated anti-Chinese sentiments, resulting in violence (i.e. riots,
protests, and beatings) targeting Chinese expatriates in Lusaka.

269 A white elephant project is an infrastructure project in which the cost of financing and upkeep is more
than its usefulness or value. Essentially, the maintenance of the project is more expensive than its profits.

93

Not embracing China as a neo-colonial force in Zambia by arguing that the
Chinese government is simply an exceptionally strong economic partner to Zambia
neglects to take into account Zambia’s postcolonial economic history which explains its
vulnerability and the fundamental imbalance of power that characterizes Sino-Zambian
relations. It is most important to acknowledge that Zambia has never necessarily been
economically independent despite gaining national independence from Britain in 1964.
Even when Zambia was sovereign and considered a middle-income country in the 1970s,
it still relied on trade with Britain in surrounding colonies. In striving for economic
independence Zambia would be fighting against neo-colonization, as the two are the
same. Despite the fact that China was not the original country that colonized Zambia,
resulting in its economic dependence, it is important that China’s role in cultivating and
exacerbating economic dependence in Zambia today should not go with impunity.
Furthermore, recognizing China as a contemporary neo-colonial force in Zambia, but not
holding Zambia accountable for its agency in fashioning this relationship gives credence
to the notion of Zambia as a victim. As previously discussed, the perspective of Zambia a
solely a patsy feeds into the narrative of Africa as the sitting duck of globalization in
which endless things “happen” to African countries, instead of taking into account the
internal power of African governments to act and make their own decisions.
As already indicated, complete economic independence for Zambia in the near
future is impractical because damage to the country’s economy (its extreme debt and
heavy reliance on FDI) runs much too deep to repair and bounce back from in the next
decade. Nevertheless, it is imperative that the Zambian government work towards
economic independence as efficiently as possible. Seeing that FDI is essential for the
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Zambian government in terms of carrying out its own national objectives, it would be
impractical and irresponsible to call for the immediate ending of Chinese FDI in Zambia.
A break in Chinese FDI would push the Zambian government into more economic
trouble because it would most likely seek to increase investment from its other neocolonial powers. Alternatively, Chinese FDI needs to be used more wisely to foster
development and enable economic independence for African countries. Chinese FDI can
facilitate development (and thus economic independence) by channeling a percentage of
it to entrepreneurial initiatives that work to transition informal work to the formal sector.
As of 2018, Lusaka had the highest percentage of residents working in the informal
sector in all of Zambia, at nearly thirty percent.270 Whereas generally employment in the
informal sector is perceived as better than no employment at all, there is no reason that it
should not be officially recognized as profitable to the national economy.271 Chinese FDI
could be channeled into entrepreneurial programs that work to help local Lusaka
residents establish their businesses as a part of the formal economy, benefiting locals
through poverty alleviation, and the government through taxes.
Moreover, the Zambian government can alter the nature of Chinese FDI by
utilizing its (limited) bargaining power to place regulations on importing unskilled
Chinese workers and by mandating improved working conditions for Zambian workers.
Whereas the Zambian government vows development through infrastructure oriented
FDI, it has failed to “combine growth-promoting policies with policies that allow the
[urban] poor to participate fully in the opportunities unleased and so contribute to that
growth. This includes policies to make labor markets work better… and increase

270 Erin Duffin. “Share of Employed Population in Informal Economy in Zambia in 2018, by Province.”
Statista, 10 Jan. 2020.
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financial inclusion.”272 As addressed in chapter 3, the anti-Chinese sentiment found
throughout Lusaka stemmed from feelings of exclusion and abandonment of the Zambian
government in terms of reaping the on-the-ground benefits of China’s One Belt One
Road initiative in their own city. By improving employment opportunities, locals will
finally see improvements in their own lives, slowly chipping away at Lusaka’s inequality
gap (one of the highest in the world).273
By all means, channeling a portion of Chinese FDI into entrepreneurial initiatives
and other poverty alleviation programs, while simultaneously improving employment
opportunities for local Zambian workers in infrastructure development in Lusaka will not
guarantee immediate economic success. But, it will foster sustained growth over a longer
period of time which will eventually help guide Zambia to decreased fiscal susceptibility
and facilitate eventual economic independence. Only once Zambia is economically
independent can the Sino-Zambian relationship be considered equal.
In recent events, the unforeseen Coronavirus, known as COVID-19, has swept
across the globe, infecting over two million people. The global pandemic originated in
Wuhan, China, and has undoubtedly threatened China’s ambitions One Belt One Road
initiative.274 We are too early on into the global pandemic to see the extent to which
China’s One Belt One Road partners will be affected both health-wise and economically.
Many of China’s One Belt One Road partners are reporting low rates of COVID-19, but
health advisors hypothesize that’s a result of lack of testing.275
“Growth: Building Jobs and Prosperity in Developing Countries.” Department for International
Development, 2019. 7.
272 “Growth: Building Jobs and Prosperity in Developing Countries.” 2.
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274 Ashutosh Pandey. “Coronavirus Could Force China to Rein in Belt and Road Ambitions.” Dw, 17 Apr.
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China’s response to COVOID-19 took expansive measures to isolate the virus and
essentially shut down cities across the country, but no measures were taken to cease
construction on One Belt One Road projects.276 Nevertheless, there was no need to.
Globally, One Belt One Road projects have come to a standstill due to the suspended
“flow of Chinese labor…with thousands of Chinese workers unable to return to their
country of work” and disrupted Chinese manufacturing supply chains that One Belt One
Road projects rely on for materials and supplies.277 COVID-19 has exposed the
vulnerability of One Belt One Road as misrepresented and reliant on Chinese goods and
services. Instead of operating like a network (as it is promoted by the Chinese), the
initiative operates on bi-lateral trade with its supposed partners.278 If One Belt One Road
projects were locally sourced, construction could have continued, and economic impact
would have been limited. As for future One Belt One Road projects, Chinese policy
banks will be less inclined to prioritize FDI over domestic economic reconstruction.279
Quite early on into the start of the global pandemic, the Chinese government
recognized the global economic disadvantage that would come with being the epicenter
of the COVID-19 outbreak. In order to remove itself from the hot seat, the Chinese
government has begun to present itself as a reliable ally to infected countries. Officials
work to make sure that “Beijing is remembered not primarily for initial cover-up and
harsh containment tactics, but as a source of eventual pandemic support.”280 Whereas the
Chinese government has begun shipping medical supplies to desperate One Belt One
Road countries, Chinese policy banks have promised to financially support companies in
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One Belt One Road counties (while maintaining true to their opaque nature by not
clarifying whether aid would only be given to Chinese companies.)281 As can be seen in
China’s COVID-19 response and the contemporary and historic Sino-African
relationship, China has found strategic value in positioning itself as a global friend, while
other economic powers position themselves as global enforcers.
In positioning itself as a friend, the Chinese government intends to (yet again) set
itself apart as a global leader in the wake of COVID-19.282 Similarly to the way in which
the Chinese government used a global infrastructure gap to create a foreign policy (One
Belt One Road) and propel China to the center of a global network, it is clear they intend
to do with same with the health crisis and the global lack of communication. China’s
Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, recently revealed that the government was looking into
constructing “an international community with a shared future’ that will tackle the current
outbreak and future pandemics by implementing an avenue for spreading information,
best practices, technology, and know-how.”283 Predictions project that if this new global
health initiative comes to fruition, it could eclipse the World Health Organization
inefficiency, essentially placing China at the center of the global health conversation.284
Despite positioning itself as a global pandemic ally, the Chinese government’s
domestic response to COVID-19 places an incredible strain on the Sino-African
relationship by prioritizing radical race-based containment measures over the rights and
well-being of African nationals in China. After five Nigerians tested positive for COVID19 in early April, the Chinese government blamed Africans in China for the spread of the

280

Lancaster, et al.
Lancaster, et al.
282 Vivian Wang and Amy Qin. “Coronavirus Fades in China, Nationalism and Xenophobia Flare.” The New
York Times, 16 Apr. 2020.
283 Brînză.
281

98

disease.285 In response, Chinese officials have imposed a very strict surveillance and
testing program, followed by a fourteen-day mandatory quarantine of all African
nationals in China, regardless of testing positive for the disease or travel history.286 This
restrictive policy has sprouted xenophobic roots and developed into the out-right
mistreatment of African nationals.
The ill-treatment of African nationals in response to COVID-19 is most obvious
in Guangzhou, one of China’s largest destinations for African traders and businessmen,
and the largest population of African nationals in China.287 In Guangzhou, African
nationals are singled out for their race, evicted from their apartments in the middle of the
night, forced into quarantine, and in some cases even refused entry to apartment buildings
and local businesses because of bans on black people.288 Clearly, containment efforts of
the disease have taken a dark turn in a racist manner, which has “snowballed into an
embarrassing and awkward diplomatic race scandal for Beijing.”289 Social media brought
international attention to the mistreatment of African nationals in China after photos and
videos of African families being violently evicted, forced to sleep outside and under
bridges during the global pandemic, and being denied entry to apartment buildings and
service in businesses surfaced online.290
African officials that “normally do not rock the boat about matters related to
China - especially at a time when African countries are looking to China for debt relief as
COVID-19 debilitates economies around the world” have expressed that the treatment of
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African nationals by the Chinese government is a betrayal of South-South solidarity.291
They have reached out to Chinese officials both informally (through social media) and
formally, to protest as an expression of their anger and concern.292 Chinese officials have
defended their merciless policy against African nationals and their refusal to hold
Chinese landlords and business owners accountable for Anti-African sentiments by
insisting it is a misunderstanding. Zhao Lijian, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson,
has asserted that all foreigners are being treated equally in China’s domestic response to
COVID-19.293 What Lijian does not take into consideration is that “not all foreigners
come from an equal footing.” 294 African nationals in China are more vulnerable to
China’s mandatory quarantine policy because they often come from lesser developed
countries with lower socioeconomic status. The mandatory quarantine policy charges an
average of US $40 to $50 per day, billed directly to the patient. Given how the disease
has essentially placed the formal and informal economy at a stand-still, some African
nationals are having immense difficulty paying their quarantine bill.295 Chinese officials
claim to have a strategy to reduce financially burdensome medical costs, but yet again,
true to its opaque nature, has not clarified how this relief program will be put into
practice.296
The public political conflict between African and Chinese officials is
unprecedented in the Sino-African relationship. Never before have “the two sides had
such a critical, high-profile, and widespread clash of positions, let alone allowed it to
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erupt in front of the public.” 297 This public clash raises the concern that even if the SinoAfrican relationship is politically mended, social fragmentation between the two societies
will be irreparable after the damage caused by Chinese society’s domestic treatment of
African nationals following COVID-19. Much like the uncertain future of Sino-African
relations, it is unclear whether or not African nationals will be socially accepted back into
their Chinese communities, as well as what kind of long term negative social
consequences they will face for being associated with the disease.
Returning to Zambia, as of April 27, 2020, there are eighty-eight recorded cases
of COVID-19 and three deaths; Zambia is currently ranked thirty-second in Africa in
numbers of cases.298 It’s been reported that the government has not yet put a stimulus
package in place, but it would be in their best interest to do so as quickly as possible.299
The Zambian government should take advantage of China’s dial back in One Belt One
Road projects in the wake of COVID-19 to gain the trust and support of Zambians.
Seizing China’s economic pullback as an opportunity would allow for the Zambian
government to distance itself from China. If the COVID-19 crisis has cracked the
window for Zambia to distance itself from China, it is up to the ambition and will of the
Zambian government to blow it wide-open and take measures to finally gain economic
independence.
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